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I. INTRODUCTION
The field of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) experienced its
“Big Bang” moment in 1906 when Roscoe Pound, then University of
Nebraska College of Law Dean, delivered his famous address, “The
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice.”1 On the seventieth anniversary of the address, Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger convened a conference, now known as the “Pound
Conference,” to revisit those ideas in the 1906 address and discuss
ways to promote greater satisfaction with the judiciary and conflict
resolution.2 Harvard Law Professor Frank Sander delivered the keynote address, outlining the possibility of a “multi-door courthouse” in
1. Lara Traum & Brian Farkas, The History and Legacy of the Pound Conferences,
18 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 677, 679 (2017).
2. Id. at 683–84 (discussing the formation of the Pound Conference and its
purposes).
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which litigants could be triaged into the most appropriate forum for
their individual dispute, such as mediation, arbitration, or litigation.3
ADR expanded rapidly over the next forty years, both as a practice
and an academic discipline. Supporters for the ADR movement included Congress, legislatures, law schools, and community dispute
resolution centers, among others.4 Mediation programs, in particular,
flourished, and courts have also experimented with arbitration programs since the Pound Conference.5
ADR scholars have long touted the many advantages of non-litigation options for disputants. Those advantages include cost and time
efficiencies, creative problem-solving, confidentiality, party autonomy
and control over the process and outcome, and flexible and accessible
processes.6 Scholars also emphasize the necessity of “buy in” by participants, courts, and providers, so that the benefits of ADR can be
fully realized.7 Questions have always lingered, however, regarding
the public’s understanding of ADR, thus implicating assumptions that
parties know enough about these processes to participate knowingly.
This Article confirms what many in the field have long feared: ADR
processes, such as mediation and arbitration, are still not well understood by the general public. Despite the many programs and advances,
the lay public generally self-reports very low familiarity with, knowledge of, and experience with ADR processes. However, this Article
goes beyond confirming low self-reported knowledge by the public by
comparing community perceptions (from those community members
who were at least minimally familiar with the necessary mechanisms)
3. Id. at 685–86 (discussing Professor Sander’s keynote address); see also Lisa
Blomgren Amsler, Dispute System Design and the Global Pound Conference, 18
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 621, 621 (2017) (“Frank Sander’s speech at the 1976
Pound Conference marked a turning point in the field’s [ADR’s] growth and development within the United States.”).
4. Traum & Farkas, supra note 1, at 689–93 (outlining the various ways that dispute resolution has expanded since the Pound Conference).
5. Kimberlee K. Kovach, Privatization of Dispute Resolution: In the Spirit of Pound,
but Mission Incomplete: Lessons Learned from a Possible Blueprint for the Future,
48 S. TEX. L. REV. 1003, 1005–07 (2007) (summarizing effects of Pound Conference on mediation, arbitration, and other processes).
6. KRISTEN M. BLANKLEY & MAUREEN A. WESTON, UNDERSTANDING DISPUTE RESOLUTION 5 (2017) (describing attributes of ADR processes).
7. See generally Yishai Boyarin, Court-Connected ADR—A Time of Crisis, a Time of
Change, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 993 (2012) (providing a general overview of the buy in
and self-determination necessary for successful dispute resolution programs);
John Lande, The Dispute Resolution Movement Needs Good Theories of Change,
2020 J. DISP. RESOL. 121, 123–25 (2020) (considering best structuring of ADR
programs after robust consideration of interests and obstacles by relevant stakeholders); Gerald F. Phillips, Support for a Full Program: Last Year’s Lessons on
Company Conflict Resolution Efforts Resonate, 27 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST
LITIG. 67, 69 (2009) (noting the importance of buy in across an organization to
implement a system-wide ADR program).
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to expert perceptions of various ADR mechanisms and the key features of those mechanisms. We found that although community members and experts have similar perceptions for some mechanisms, there
are mechanisms for which their perceptions differ significantly. This
distinction suggests that even community members who report being
familiar with a mechanism may misunderstand important aspects of
that mechanism.
These findings implicate core ethical and practical considerations
for lawyers, ADR neutrals, and court systems. As discussed below,8
lawyers and ADR practitioners rely on informed consent of their clients who are participating in these processes. If the general public is
still unfamiliar with these processes forty years after their existence,
the implication is that lawyers, neutrals, and courts may not be fulfilling their educational duty to ensure the requirement of informed consent. This Article not only examines these ethical issues but also
considers ways to change practice to meet these ethical requirements
and conform to best practices.
This Article proceeds in five main parts. Part II examines the research to date in both legal and social science publications regarding
the general public’s knowledge of ADR processes.9 Part III provides an
overview of the study and how it relates to the literature.10 Part IV
sets forth the study’s methodology,11 and Part V provides the applicable results of the study.12 Part VI considers the far-reaching implications of the study, including how such implications affect lawyers’
ethical obligations related to client counseling and how third parties
conduct their practices.13
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Current research about people’s awareness or knowledge of ADR
processes is sparse. Lawyers and academics commonly presume low
knowledge of ADR processes by the general public with little clarity
regarding what people in the general public do and do not know. For
example, one dominant view of lawyering is the “traditional model,”
which defines the lawyer as expert and the client as a person or entity
needing guidance.14 In the literature, discussions of “client control”
and of the ethical responsibilities of lawyers (e.g., to offer their clients
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See infra section VI.A.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
BLANKLEY & WESTON, supra note 6, at 11 (describing the primary differences between the lawyer-centered model and the client-centered model of the attorney–client relationship).
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information and process choices that match client values) often portray the legal actors as experts on the process, while the clients’ expertise pertains to their own personal goals and values.15 Meanwhile,
individual scholars have made broad assertions such as, “Many litigants do not know that dispute resolution procedures other than litigation exist, many do not understand the fundamental workings of
how various procedures operate to resolve disputes, and many do not
appreciate the strategic application of these procedures to their
case.”16 Others point to a “commonly held belief [among those in legal
circles] . . . that resistance to the mediation process is a direct result of
the widespread lack of information about the process [among clients].”17 Although these scholars primarily refer to client knowledge
of mediation, one could assume similarly low knowledge of arbitration
and other specialized processes.18
The presumption that lawyers and their clients have different expertise (in processes and values respectively) could be viewed as an
appropriate and acceptable separation of roles and responsibilities.
Significant barriers to entry exist to practice law, such as educational
requirements, character and fitness assessments, and bar passage
mandates.19 The bar exam tests subjects relating to process, such as
civil procedure, evidence, and criminal procedure.20 The expert model
of law services can also be viewed as appropriate given the low success
15. See, e.g., Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Legal Representation and the Next Steps Toward
Client Control: Attorney Malpractice for the Failure to Allow the Client to Control
Negotiation and Pursue Alternatives to Litigation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 819,
825–27 (1990) (discussing the means/ends model of the attorney–client relationship and its shortfalls). See infra subsection VI.A.2 for additional discussion of
the ethical rules regarding decision-making in an attorney–client relationship.
16. Elayne E. Greenberg, . . . Because “Yes” Actually Means “No”: A Personalized Prescriptive to Reactualize Informed Consent in Dispute Resolution, 102 MARQ. L.
REV. 197, 200 (2018).
17. Maria R. Volpe & Charles Bahn, Resistance to Mediation: Understanding and
Handling It, 10 SOCIO. PRAC. 26, 28 (1992).
18. And it seems like this is indeed presumed, sometimes with supporting evidence.
See infra notes 19–21 and accompanying text; see also Amy J. Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical Data in Crafting Arbitration Reforms, 15
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 143 (2010) (“Overall, the available research about process satisfaction indicates a lack of consumer information and understanding
about arbitration.”) (supporting the assumption that consumer information relating to ADR is low); Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne Brett, Disputants’ Perceptions of
Dispute Resolution Procedures: An Ex Ante and Ex Post Longitudinal Empirical
Study, 41 CONN. L. REV. 63, 96 (2008) (suggesting that less knowledge of nonadjudicative procedures may influence younger disputants’ preferences for
processes with a more powerful third-party decision maker).
19. Carol Goforth, Why the Bar Exam Fails to Raise the Bar, 42 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 47,
52–53 (2015) (describing modern requirements to practice law).
20. Understanding the Uniform Bar Exam, NAT’L CONF. B. EXAMINERS (July 2017),
https://www.ncbex.org/pdfviewer/?file=%2Fdmsdocument%2F209 [https://
perma.unl.edu/JFQ9-7BT3] (listing Uniform Bar Exam topics).
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rates of pro se parties in courts, which is often attributable to lack of
process knowledge.21
Despite the potential appropriateness of such a separation of roles,
some scholars and legal actors have nevertheless suggested the importance of considering and addressing low client knowledge of legal
processes. At a very basic level, some note it is reasonable to question
whether clients are giving “meaningful informed consent” if they
agree to a process that they do not understand or for which they do not
know the alternatives.22 Others note that clients should be given process choices because they are most affected by the outcomes of their
cases, which are impacted by those processes.23 Further, client knowledge is important to empower clients to make choices between different forms of dispute resolution in a manner that is consistent with
their values.24 Client knowledge of alternative mechanisms, and the
advantages of those mechanisms, is also necessary to potentially sway
their preferences away from default mechanisms like litigation,25
which are often more costly and less effective at meeting client goals.
Client knowledge of various process options, especially if that knowledge results in positive evaluations, may increase the use of ADR
processes26 and potentially increase client “buy in” when offered or
ordered to use ADR options.27
21. Kristen M. Blankley, Adding by Subtracting: How Limited Scope Agreements for
Dispute Resolution Representation Can Increase Access to Attorney Services, 28
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 659, 665–72 (2013) (describing limitations for pro se
parties and providing statistics on pro se party success rates).
22. Greenberg, supra note 16, at 200–01.
23. Donna Shestowsky, Disputants’ Preferences for Court-Connected Dispute Resolution Procedures: Why We Should Care and Why We Know So Little, 23 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 549, 550 (2008) (“The disputants—more than anyone else—must
endure the psychological, financial, and other consequences of the outcomes that
are reached.”).
24. Greenberg, supra note 16, at 200–01.
25. Volpe & Bahn, supra note 17, at 33 (suggesting lack of knowledge discourages
disputants from selecting mediation).
26. Roselle L. Wissler, When Does Familiarity Breed Content? A Study of the Role of
Different Forms of ADR Education and Experience in Attorneys’ ADR Recommendations, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 199, 202–05 (2002) (discussing how litigants
are unlikely to propose ADR mechanisms but are often willing to use ADR
processes when given the option by their attorney). Two scholars explained:
The newness of the [mediation] program may have resulted in some
skepticism about it. In fact, one of the program’s directors reported to us
that, years ago, when a different division of the Circuit Court instituted
an arbitration program (for certain types of civil cases where the amount
in controversy is less than $30,000), it took nearly a decade after its inception to garner noticeable attorney support. This fact highlights the
idea that general familiarity with ADR procedures in a jurisdiction, and
support of the bar, can influence procedural choice.
Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 18, at 97 (footnotes omitted).
27. See generally Robert Rubinson, Client Counseling, Mediation, and Alternative
Narratives of Dispute Resolution, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 833 (2004) (discussing how
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To address client knowledge and understanding, we need to know
something about that knowledge and understanding.28 As we review
below, the research exploring client knowledge of various dispute resolution mechanisms, while generally supporting a thesis of low public
knowledge, does little to clarify the characteristics and qualities of
what people do and do not “know.”29 According to cognitive psychologists, knowledge is not a unitary or unidimensional construct of which
one simply has more or less; knowledge comes in different types,
which can exist at different levels, encompass different characteristics, and develop in different ways.30 Knowledge can, for example, be
explicit, implicit,31 situated,32 factual, conceptual, procedural,
metacognitive,33 subjective, objective, tacit,34 expert, novice, empirical, experience-based, narrative-based, discipline-based, conscious,
unconscious, rational, conventional, cognitive, affective, psychomotor,
and so on and so forth.35
One of the most well-known knowledge taxonomies was first developed by Benjamin Bloom in the 1950s.36 Bloom’s taxonomy distinguishes types of knowledge in terms of what is required for people to
demonstrate a particular level of knowledge.37 Do people need to remember, understand, apply, analyze, evaluate, or create with the
things they “know”?38 Each level of Bloom’s taxonomy requires

28.

29.
30.
31.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

common narratives around conflict bias disputants against ADR procedures unless disrupted by attorneys).
Cf. Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 18, at 63 (explaining that for clients to be
adequately advised about their procedural options, courts and attorneys must understand how disputants evaluate and experience different ADR options). While
our focus is on client knowledge of procedures rather than perception, the principle is essentially the same.
See infra notes 45–59 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., HOWARD GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE REFRAMED – MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (1999).
E.g., Daniel L. Schacter, Mary Pat McAndrews & Morris Moscovitch, Access to
Consciousness: Dissociations Between Implicit and Explicit Knowledge in Neuropsychological Syndromes, in THOUGHT WITHOUT LANGUAGE 242–78 (Lawrence
Weiskrantz ed., 1988).
E.g., JEAN LAVE & ETIENNE WENGER, SITUATED LEARNING: LEGITIMATE PERIPHERAL PARTICIPATION (1991).
E.g., A TAXONOMY FOR LEARNING, TEACHING, AND ASSESSING: A REVISION OF
BLOOM’S TAXONOMY OF EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES (Lorin W. Anderson & David R.
Krathwohl eds., 2001).
See Charlotte Linde, Narrative and Social Tacit Knowledge, 5 J. KNOWLEDGE
MGMT. 160 (2001).
E.g., Robert N. Carson, A Taxonomy of Knowledge Types for Use in Curriculum
Design, 35 INTERCHANGE 59, 68–73 (2004) (describing different types of
knowledge).
BENJAMIN S. BLOOM ET AL., TAXONOMY OF EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES, HANDBOOK I:
COGNITIVE DOMAIN (1956).
See, e.g., Anderson & Krathwohl, supra note 33.
David R. Krathwohl, A Revision of Bloom’s Taxonomy: An Overview, 41 THEORY
INTO PRAC. 212, 212–18 (2002). Specifically, Table 3 on page 215 categorizes the
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deeper, more complicated cognitive operations involving what someone “knows.”39 In the case of remembering, people simply need to
bring to mind something to which they have been exposed—understanding does not matter.40 For example, remembering whether or not
one had mediation as an option for resolving a dispute requires no
understanding of what mediation actually is, only a memory of
whether or not it (whatever it is) was offered. To demonstrate understanding, on the other hand, one might accurately summarize what
mediation entails.41 In many cases, however, the reason for giving a
client information about different dispute resolution process options is
to involve the client in the very complex process of “evaluating” one or
more process options so that the lawyer and client can together determine which options meet the client’s needs and goals. Evaluation requires complex cognitive operations, including many of the lower
levels of Bloom’s taxonomy.42 For example, evaluating dispute resolution process options may require being aware of, remembering, and
distinguishing between different features of various process options;
understanding and analyzing the implications and potential effects of
such differentiating features; and applying those comparisons to one’s
situation-specific priorities.
We thus can argue that for clients to be empowered to choose, or
even to form a preference for, some form of ADR over litigation based
on accurate knowledge, they need not only be aware of the various
mechanisms. At the very least, they also need to have access to (be
able to remember at the time of their decision) the different features of
the mechanisms, have an understanding (at the time of their decision)
of the relevance and potential benefits or drawbacks of those features,
and then be able to apply their knowledge and understanding to their
own situations in light of their personal values. Achieving these different levels of knowledge—that is, learning at these different levels—
involves different cognitive processes.43 Experience with (as opposed
to simply being told about) the mechanisms can enhance numerous
levels of the taxonomy including memory, understanding, application,
and other higher-level forms of knowledge expression.44

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

44.

cognitive process to include “remember, understand, apply, analyze, evaluate,
and create” with respect to knowledge. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Anderson & Krathwohl, supra note 33; Alison Crowe, Clarissa Dirks &
Mary Pat Wenderoth, Biology in Bloom: Implementing Bloom’s Taxonomy to Enhance Student Learning in Biology, 7 CBE—LIFE SCI. EDUC. 368 (2008).
See generally Alice Y. Kolb & David A. Kolb, Learning Styles and Learning
Spaces: Enhancing Experiential Learning in Higher Education, 4 ACAD. MGMT.
LEARNING & EDUC. 193 (2005).
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What does the past research say about what the general public
“knows” (e.g., is aware of, remembers, understands, and applies)
about ADR mechanisms? Professor Donna Shestowsky’s work in this
area is especially relevant. Relating to the lowest levels of knowledge
in Bloom’s taxonomy, few laypeople seem to be aware of or able to
remember whether their court offers mediation and/or arbitration, especially if they lack experience (i.e., it was their first time in court).45
Professor Shestowsky surveyed litigants in three different state courts
that offered litigation, mediation, and arbitration options.46 Approximately three-quarters of the litigants could not properly identify that
their court offered mediation, and a similar number were not aware or
did not remember that the court offered arbitration. Only 15% of the
sample recalled that their court offered both mediation and arbitration.47 In other words, the study uncovered “widespread lack of litigant awareness” about available options.48 Shestowsky also found no
statistically significant difference in ability to remember the different
options when comparing represented and unrepresented clients,49
calling to question whether lawyers meaningfully counseled clients regarding their options, or counseled them about ADR options at all.
We found little research that directly and purposely examined
layperson understanding of or application of knowledge about dispute
resolution processes. One rare survey study by Professors Jill Gross
and Barbara Black examined perceptions of securities arbitrations
among arbitration participants, including 1359 customers, 926 lawyers/representatives, 460 associated persons, and 202 corporate representatives.50 Customers, who are most like laypersons, indicated
“don’t know” at a higher rate than other participants in the survey on
a number of the survey questions.51 For example, less than 50% of
customers (compared to 94% of other participants) indicated they
knew that one of the arbitrators in the case would be an “industry
arbitrator,” or an arbitrator with professional or familial connections
to the securities industry.52 Similarly, less than 50% of customers
(compared to 88% of other participants) indicated they knew which
45. Donna Shestowsky, When Ignorance Is Not Bliss: An Empirical Study of Litigants’ Awareness of Court-Sponsored Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs,
22 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 189 (2017) [hereinafter Ignorance].
46. Id. at 206–07 (discussing the method of the study).
47. Id. at 211–12 (discussing results).
48. Id. at 219.
49. Id. at 222 (discussing results).
50. Jill I. Gross & Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Empirical
Study of Investors’ Views of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. DISP.
RESOL. 349, 362 (2008).
51. Id. at 388.
52. FINRA currently classifies its arbitrators as “public” or “non-public.” A “public
arbitrator” cannot be a securities broker, dealer, investment advisor, or someone
who has served as a lawyer for any of the foregoing, among other conditions.
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arbitrators were “public” versus “industry.” A substantial percentage
of customers (and significantly more than other participants) also indicated “don’t know” when asked their opinions about whether the arbitration panel applied the law, appeared competent, understood the
legal arguments, and so on, suggesting many customers felt their
knowledge level was not sufficient to make such judgments.53
Other research has at least tangential relevance to what laypersons might understand about dispute resolution processes more generally. Professors Shestowsky and Brett’s 2008 longitudinal field
study included assessing layperson disputants’ preferences for different dispute resolution features prior to their case being resolved.54
Professors Shestowsky and Brett did not ask participants to identify
which court processes were associated with which features.55 Still,
their factor analysis of the preference ratings for their fourteen features suggested that “disputant control” and “third party control”
were characteristics that may be salient to disputants.56 Given this
finding, we might expect to find that laypeople are more attentive to,
and therefore achieve an understanding more readily regarding, the
extent to which various processes give disputants control versus give
third parties control.
Even less research pertains to layperson application of their understanding to choices of processes, but the research that does exist suggests such application is lacking. Professors Shestowsky and Brett’s
2008 study57 found “disputants’ initial preferences did not predict the
procedural model they used,” which the authors suggested might be
because time and cost factors prevented preference from being realized, the opposing disputants’ preferences interfered, or their lawyers’
preferences exerted more influence over choices than the clients’ own
preferences. What Professors Shestowsky and Brett did not mention,
however, is the possibility that clients are not aware of which
processes match their feature preferences, thereby impairing their
ability to apply that knowledge to advocate for the processes that
would match those preferences. This would be consistent with Professor Shestowsky’s 2016 study, which found a disconnect between macro
preferences for certain processes and micro preferences for specific
features of those processes.58 Professor Shestowsky surmised the disconnect could be due to complex preferences for combinations of fea-

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

FINRA, Rule 12100 (aa) (2007). A “non-public arbitrator” is one who does not
meet the requirements of a public arbitrator. FINRA, Rule 12100 (t).
Gross & Black, supra note 50, at 388 (discussing results).
Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 18, at 82.
Id.
Id. at 94–95.
Id. at 97.
Donna Shestowsky, How Litigants Evaluate the Characteristics of Legal Procedures: A Multi-Court Empirical Study, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 793, 832–33 (2016).
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tures, rather than a single feature, but that a “more compelling and
troubling explanation for the apparent disconnect is that it might
stem from an inaccurate understanding of which attributes actually
characterize various procedures.”59
It is worth noting that one way for disputants to become aware of
and increase their understanding of their alternate dispute process
options is through their attorneys during client counseling.60 Prior investigations suggest that clients are willing to use ADR procedures
when they are suggested as an option, even if they do not initiate requests for those procedures.61 Yet, when the litigants in the aforementioned 2016 Shestowsky study were asked, in an open-ended matter,
which processes they or their attorneys contemplated using to resolve
their dispute, roughly one-third reported mediation and only about
one-quarter reported arbitration, suggesting attorneys were not often
informing their clients about these processes.62 For attorneys to pass
along such information to their clients, the attorneys must know
something about the specific options and also believe the processes
could be beneficial to their clients. It seems unlikely that attorneys
will waste their clients’ time explaining processes that they do not recommend. Research by Professor Roselle Wissler indicates that lawyers
are more likely to discuss ADR options when they are more familiar
and have more experience with those processes.63
III. CURRENT STUDY
As reviewed, academics and practitioners assume that public
knowledge of ADR processes is relatively low,64 and, to the extent that
lawyers are the experts in process,65 many may consider the lack of
public understanding of ADR processes acceptable. To the extent the
public does not understand ADR processes, though, there is arguably
an additional burden for attorneys and other ADR practitioners to inform and assist clients.66 But, to truly understand the needs of the
client and fully appreciate the role of attorneys in informing and assisting their clients, it is necessary to have an empirically informed
59. Id. at 833.
60. Wissler, supra note 26, at 205 (noting that attorneys’ central roles in litigation
makes them an appropriate person to educate disputants on ADR processes and
options in their case).
61. Id. at 203–05 (discussing litigants’ reasons for not using ADR).
62. Shestowsky, supra note 45, at 216–17.
63. See Wissler, supra note 26; see also Roselle L. Wissler, Barriers to Attorneys’ Discussion and Use of ADR, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 459, 465 (2004) [hereinafter Barriers] (explaining that attorneys’ knowledge of ADR affects whether they
discuss ADR with their clients).
64. Wissler, supra note 26, at 203.
65. Id.
66. See infra Part VI.
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understanding of the public’s knowledge of ADR processes, rather
than relying on unsubstantiated assumptions. Unfortunately, the reviewed literature suggests a lack of empirical evidence characterizing
the broader public’s knowledge of various dispute resolution
processes. Thus, lawyers and other legal practitioners lack the necessary information to adequately and appropriately inform and assist
their clients.
To help fill this gap, this Article presents self-reported data on
community members’ familiarity with, knowledge of, and experience
with various dispute resolution mechanisms. The community member
participants—unlike those in the studies discussed in the literature
review—were not currently engaged in conflict or litigation. They
were simply members of the general public. Although we did not specifically seek to extensively examine public knowledge of dispute resolution, this data provides some, albeit limited, insight. In sharing
these findings, we seek to provide context for discussing the ethical
and practical implications of working with clients who are less knowledgeable about their potential dispute resolution options and highlight the need to better understand the public’s awareness of and
knowledge about such options.
This data is based on secondary data analyses from a study designed to (1) differentiate dispute resolution processes by using specific features for five dispute resolution mechanisms based on experts’
understanding of those processes, and (2) compare experts’ and community members’ perceptions of the dispute resolution mechanisms.67
The original study involved generating a comprehensive list of dispute
resolution features from descriptions of dispute resolution processes
available in academic and practitioner literature.68 With this comprehensive list of dispute resolution features, we then generated plain
language statements,69 and using these statements, participants
67. The results of this study are reported in Ashley M. Votruba, Logen M. Bartz, Lisa
M. PytlikZillig & Kristen M. Blankley, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Distinguishing ADR Processes by Their Features (forthcoming) (on file with authors).
68. Our review included sources such as: (1) well-regarded textbooks (located based
on recommendations from law faculty teaching alternative dispute resolution
courses; e.g., MICHAEL L. MOFFITT & ROBERT C. BORDONE, THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2005)); (2) treatises and law review articles (located using
search terms like “alternative dispute resolution + processes/mechanisms/definitions” in Lexis, Westlaw, HeinOnline, and Google Scholar); and (3) practitioneroriented mechanism descriptions (located using similar search terms; e.g., Dispute Resolution Processes, AM. B. ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_resolution/resources/DisputeResolutionProcesses [https://perma.unl.edu/
5FFD-3EY6] (last visited June 29, 2020)).
69. One example of a plain language statement is: “In this dispute resolution mechanism how often do the people involved in the dispute resolution process . . .
[d]ecide for themselves whether to participate,” to measure whether “voluntariness” is a characteristic of each dispute resolution mechanism.
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rated how often they considered a feature to be a characteristic of each
dispute resolution mechanism. Members of the scientific and practitioner communities reviewed the measure to ensure the list of features was comprehensive and offered feedback on the individual
items. These items comprised the primary measure of interest in the
study for both the community and expert samples.
In the study, the participants were asked to rate how often the features were a characteristic of the process for five dispute resolution
mechanisms: litigation, arbitration, evaluative mediation, facilitative
mediation, and negotiation. We chose to focus on these dispute resolution processes because they represent much of the variability in dispute resolution process features and are processes that are of interest
in empirical studies examining dispute resolution preferences.70 We
specifically included two types of mediation (evaluative and facilitative) because they involve a distinct difference in the role of the mediator, which is a key feature difference.71 Further, this distinction was
necessary for the expert sample, which is accustomed to distinguishing between evaluative and facilitative mediation, and questions
about the role of the third party could not be meaningfully answered
without drawing this distinction. Notably, because this research
sought to validate commonly used definitions of dispute resolution
mechanisms by practitioners and experts in the field, the survey instrument simply used the names of the mechanisms and made no attempt to define them for the participants.
In the study, we also obtained from the community sample selfreported data of familiarity with, knowledge of, and experience with
the dispute resolution mechanisms in the study. The purpose of collecting this information was to ensure that the community participants had at least some minimal level of familiarity with each of the
dispute resolution mechanisms so that we would be able to collect
meaningful data. We included multiple measures in the study, recognizing that they represent distinct concepts that impact what psychology classifies more broadly as knowledge. The findings from those
measures are the focal analyses in this Article. Although we had no
specific hypotheses regarding familiarity, knowledge, and experience,
we were surprised to find the extremely low levels of each in our community sample.
70. E.g., Larry B. Heuer & Steven Penrod, Procedural Preference as a Function of
Conflict Intensity, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 700 (1986); Kwok Leung,
Some Determinants of Reactions to Procedural Models for Conflict Resolution: A
Cross-National Study, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 898 (1986); E. Allen
Lind, Yuen J. Huo & Tom R. Tyler, . . . And Justice For All: Ethnicity, Gender,
and Preferences for Dispute Resolution Procedures, 18 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 269
(1994); Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 18.
71. E.g., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE: STATE AND FEDERAL LAW § 11C.03(2)
(Michael B. Gerrard ed., vol. 2A 2020).
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In addition to the primary results focusing on the community participants’ self-reported familiarity with, knowledge of, and experience
with dispute resolution process, this Article also details three findings
from this dataset that are reported more extensively in our other paper.72 These findings highlight how community members and experts
differ in their understanding of the features of the five dispute resolution processes of interest. We expect to see differences in community
members’ and experts’ perceptions of how often certain features are
present for those dispute resolution processes that community members are less knowledgeable about. We focus on perceptions of selfdetermination, voluntary participation, and whether the process is
collaborative since these are each essential features distinguishing between dispute resolution processes. Prior to discussing our methods,
we provide a brief overview of these three characteristics from the
literature.
Self-determination, or the ability of a party to determine the outcome of a dispute, is an essential feature of consensual processes such
as negotiation and mediation.73 On the other hand, adjudicatory
processes such as litigation and arbitration place the decision-making
authority in the hands of a third-party judge or arbitrator.74 Given
this stark difference on the “who decides” question (party vs. neutral),
comparing these answers between experts and community samples
provides insight in how different people view these characteristics.
Voluntariness has multiple meanings within the ADR literature.
At one level, ADR processes are voluntary when parties choose to use
the process.75 The concept of voluntariness can extend to pre-dispute
agreements to use a dispute resolution process in the event that a conflict occurs at a later date.76 For some processes, voluntariness also
72. Votruba et al., supra note 67.
73. BLANKLEY & WESTON, supra note 6, at 51 (“The consensual nature of the process
puts an incredible amount of power (sometimes described as party autonomy) in
the hands of the parties . . . . Compared to adjudicatory processes (such as litigation and arbitration), mediation is the parties’ process . . . .”).
74. Id. at 177 (“Arbitration is a process of dispute resolution in which a third-party
neutral—the arbitrator—renders a decision after a hearing. . . . This description
probably sounds very similar to litigation, and arbitration and litigation share
many characteristics.”).
75. See, e.g., John R. Phillips, Mediation as One Step in Adversarial Litigation: One
Country Lawyer’s Experience, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 143, 149–50 (2002) (discussing
results of a jurisdiction’s experience with a mediation program requiring participants to opt into the program); Shestowsky, supra note 23, at 552 (“[T]ruly voluntary ADR programs . . . allow parties to select and shape the procedure they
use.”). See generally Elizabeth Plapinger & Margaret Shaw, Court ADR: Elements
of Program Design, 10 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 151 (1992) (contrasting
programs with voluntary participation to those with mandatory participation).
76. Arbitration, in particular, relies on pre-dispute resolution clauses. Arbitration is
still considered voluntary if the parties give voluntary consent to the agreement.
See Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOF-
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refers to the participants’ desire to stay in and continue the process
through completion.77 In mediation, for example, a party may be
court-referred or statutorily required to attend mediation, but the process still has aspects of voluntariness because the parties still decide
whether to settle and on what terms.78
Whether a process is collaborative largely turns on whether the
parties have the opportunity to work together to resolve their dispute.
Specifically, in collaborative processes, the parties decide the outcome,
not a third party.79 In this context, the term “collaborative” is essentially synonymous with “consensual,” meaning the parties decide
whether to settle and on what terms.80
IV.

METHODS

As part of this data collection effort, the research team collected
considerable information about the community members’ familiarity
with five forms of dispute resolution, knowledge about those
processes, and their personal experience. We focus the first part of the
results on these questions. The second part of the results compares
knowledgeable community members’ and experts’ perceptions of the
five dispute resolution processes along the dimension of self-determination, voluntariness, and collaboration, key features that distinguish
between different types of dispute resolution processes.
A. Participants
The dataset for the broader project included two groups of participants: community members and experts. Although we focus primarily
on the community sample’s knowledge questions, we also report findings explicitly comparing the two samples. Thus, the sample information and recruitment methods for both types of participants are
described in the subsequent subsections.

77.

78.
79.

80.

STRA L. REV. 83, 107–08 (1996) (“A pre-dispute arbitration agreement is a contract. . . . Voluntary consent occurs prior to performance, at the time of contract
formation.”).
BLANKLEY & WESTON, supra note 6, at 105 (noting that “voluntariness means
coming to a voluntary resolution,” even when attendance is mandated by a court,
statute, or court rule).
Id.
See, e.g., UNIFORM COLLABORATIVE LAW RULES R. 2.3 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010)
(defining a “collaborative law process” as one that resolves a matter “without intervention by a tribunal”).
See, e.g., Kristen M. Blankley, Agreeing to Collaborate in Advance, 32 OHIO ST. J.
DISP. RESOL. 559, 581–82 (2017) (“Mediation is a consensual process, meaning
that all decision-making authority lies in the hands of the participants and that
the neutral has no ability to impose a decision upon the parties.”); id. at 583–84
(“Like mediation, negotiation is a consensual process.”).
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1. Community Sample
We sought a diverse sample of community members from the
United States to assess the general public’s perceptions of dispute resolution processes using CloudResearch,81 a platform for online research and surveys that recruits participants from Amazon’s
MechanicalTurk (MTurk), a platform for recruiting participants that
vary widely in age, education, socioeconomic status, ethnicity, and geographic location.82 Data collected on MTurk is generally comparable
to data collected using more traditional sources,83 and quality data
can be achieved if proper screening measures and attention checks are
employed.84 For example, prior to entering the study, potential participants were screened using questions designed to detect bots (e.g., a
captcha check) and participants from outside of the United States.
Only those who successfully completed those questions were able to
access the study. The participants that completed the study were compensated $2.00. The median amount of time it took the community
participants to complete the study was just over 15 minutes. In total,
632 community participants completed the study (Mean age = 39.60;
SD = 12.51). Additional demographic information is reported in Table
1 for the participants who provided that information.
2. Expert Sample
The expert sample was recruited using professional listservs for
alternative dispute resolution professionals.85 The participants who
81. See CLOUDRESEARCH, https://www.cloudresearch.com/ [https://perma.unl.edu/
8FSP-WVM2] (last visited Feb. 5, 2021); AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://
www.mturk.com/ [https://perma.unl.edu/XJ44-EYE7] (last visited Feb. 5, 2021)
(MTurk is a crowdsourcing marketplace of “workers” who complete tasks
(HITs)—such as participation in research—online for payment); see also KIM
BARTEL SHEEHAN & MATTHEW PITTMAN, AMAZON’S MECHANICAL TURK FOR ACADEMICS: THE HIT HANDBOOK FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH, ch. 1 (2016) (providing a general overview of MTurk).
82. E.g., Matthew J. C. Crump, John V. McDonnell & Todd M. Gureckis, Evaluating
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk as a Tool for Experimental Behavioral Research, 8
PLOS ONE 1, 2 (2013); Winter Mason & Siddharth Suri, Conducting Behavioral
Research on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, 44 BEHAV. RES. METHODS 1, 3 (2012).
83. See generally Crump, supra note 82; Mason & Suri, supra note 82; BARTEL
SHEEHAN & PITTMAN, supra note 81.
84. E.g., Ryan Kennedy et al., The Shape of and Solutions to the MTurk Quality Crisis, POL. SCI. RES. & METHODS, Sept. 2020, at 1, 13. Our recruitment criteria
limited participation to individuals over the age of majority who are located
within the United States and have successfully completed 500 HITs with a 97%
acceptance rate (as recommended by BARTEL SHEEHAN & PITTMAN, supra note 81,
at 32).
85. The researchers utilized national and regional listservs to recruit experts to take
the survey. Those listservs included: 1) the DRLE listserv of dispute resolution
academics, hosted by the University of Missouri School of Law; 2) the Nebraska
ADR listserv, hosted by the Nebraska State Bar Association; 3) the Nebraska
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completed the study were compensated with a $10 gift card. The median amount of time it took the expert participants to complete the
study was approximately 22 minutes. 254 expert participants completed the study (Mean age = 55.76; SD = 16.06). Additional demographic information for the expert participants is also found in Table
1.
Table 1 - Participants’ Demographic Information
All
# (%)

Community
# (%)

Expert
# (%)

Male/Man/Masculine

456 (51.5%)

348 (55.1%)

108 (42.5%)

Female/Woman/Feminine

389 (43.9%)

276 (43.7%)

113 (44.5%)

Transman/Transmasculine

2 (0.2%)

2 (0.3%)

0

0

0

0

5 (0.6%)

5 (0.8%)

0

549 (62.0%)

413 (65.3%)

136 (53.5%)

African American/Black

59 (6.7%)

49 (7.8%)

10 (3.9%)

Lantina/o/x or Hispanic

43 (4.9%)

34 (5.4%)

9 (3.5%)

Asian/Asian American

139 (15.7%)

111 (17.6%)

28 (11.0%)

Native American

1 (0.1%)

0

1 (0.4%)

Middle Eastern

5 (0.6%)

0

5 (2.0%)

Biracial/Multiracial

22 (2.5%)

18 (2.8%)

4 (1.6%)

Not captured above

7 (0.8%)

1 (0.2%)

6 (2.4%)

Variable/ Response Option
Gender

Transwoman/Transfeminine
Gender nonconforming

Ethnicity
White/European American

B. Survey Instrument
As previously described, the primary purpose of the data collection
effort was to compare community members’ and experts’ perceptions
of features of five dispute resolution processes: litigation, arbitration,
Family Law listserv, hosted by the Nebraska State Bar Association; 4) the NYCDR listserv, hosted by the John Jay College of Criminal Justice; 5) the Dispute
Resolution Ethics Committee listserv, hosted by the American Bar Association;
and 6) the MEDIATE-AND-ARBITRATE listserv, hosted by Paul M. Lurie of
Shiff Hardin LLP.
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evaluative mediation, facilitative mediation, and negotiation.86 In the
study, we also collected data on the community participants’ familiarity with, knowledge of, and experience with five dispute resolution
processes that are commonly used to resolve legal conflict. The following paragraphs describe in detail the questions included in the survey
instrument which we analyze in this Article.87 The description is in
the same order we report the results.
At the beginning of the study, the community participants were
asked to rate their familiarity with each of the five processes.88 These
items were included at the beginning of the study to ensure that only
the community participants who were at least somewhat familiar with
the processes would provide their perceptions of those processes. The
question stated, “Before we examine your perceptions of each of the
types of dispute resolution, we would like to better understand your
familiarity with each of the processes. How familiar are you with each
of the following?” Participants were then asked to rate their familiarity with litigation, arbitration, evaluative mediation, facilitative mediation, and negotiation.89
Then, at the end of the study, participants in the community sample were asked several questions examining their knowledge of and
experience with each of the five dispute resolution processes. Specifically, the community participants were asked to rate their overall
knowledge (“How would you rate your overall knowledge of each of the
following dispute resolution mechanisms?”90) and experience levels
(“How would you rate your overall experience level with each of the
following dispute resolution mechanisms?”91) for each dispute resolution process.92 The community sample was also asked, “In which of
the following dispute resolution mechanisms have you been a participant?” and directed to check all that applied for litigation, arbitration,
evaluative mediation, facilitative mediation, and negotiation.
The bulk of the study for both the community and expert samples
involved examining their perceptions of the five dispute resolution
processes across twenty-three common features that distinguish be86. The results of that comparison are available in our other paper, Votruba et al.,
supra note 67.
87. See infra Part V.
88. See infra Figure A.
89. Ratings were provided on a scale of 1 = I have never heard of this term until now;
2 = I have heard of it but have no idea what it is; 3 = I have heard of it and have
slight knowledge of it; 4 = I have heard of it and have some knowledge of it; and 5
= I have heard of it and have quite a bit of knowledge about it.
90. Ratings were provided on a scale of 1 = Not knowledgeable to 5 = Very
knowledgeable.
91. Ratings were provided on a scale of 1 = Not experienced to 5 = Very experienced.
92. See infra Figure B (knowledge) and Figure C (experience).
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tween the various dispute resolution processes.93 Both the community
and expert samples were asked to rate how common each feature was
for the five dispute resolution processes.94 Although we do not comprehensively report those results in this Article, we do report findings
focusing on three of the key features. To inquire about each of the features, we began with the same prompt, “In this dispute resolution
mechanism how often are the people involved in the dispute resolution
process . . . .” The statement was completed for each of the three key
features as follows: (1) self-determination: “the ones deciding how to
resolve the dispute”; (2) voluntariness: “decid[ing] for themselves
whether to participate”; and (3) collaborative solutions: “work[ing] together to reach a solution.” Ratings were measured using sliders that
could be moved between 0 and 10, with 0 = never and 10 = always.
V. RESULTS
A. Analysis of Community Participants’ Familiarity with,
Knowledge of, and Experience with Dispute
Resolution Processes
We begin the analyses by examining community members’ level of
understanding of various dispute resolution processes. The familiarity
and knowledge questions similarly reflect subjective knowledge (one’s
self-assessment of one’s familiarity or knowledge) but were answered
at different points of the study. The familiarity question, administered
at the study outset, is likely to reflect one’s initial gut reaction assessment, and we transformed that question to reflect the simpler construct of awareness. The knowledge question at the end of the study is
likely to reflect a more deliberative assessment of one’s subjective
knowledge, due to the intervening survey questions that ask about
specific aspects of each dispute resolution process. Given the important influence experience can have on knowledge generally, experience is another important indicator.95 Examining all three indicators
paints a more detailed and complete picture of the community members’ knowledge about the dispute resolution processes of interest.
93. For a more in-depth discussion of the survey and these features, please see Votruba et al., supra note 67. We conducted a comprehensive review of alternative
dispute resolution materials to collect descriptions of dispute resolution
processes, and from those descriptions, we generated a comprehensive list of dispute resolution process features using thematic analysis.
94. These dispute resolution processes were the most common processes encountered
during the literature review for the thematic analysis. The decision to include
facilitative and evaluative mediation, rather than mediation as a stand-alone
term, was made because the two were presented as distinct from one another on
many of the features identified during the thematic analysis.
95. See supra Part II.
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1. Awareness of the Dispute Resolution Process
The community participant survey began by asking participants
how familiar they were with the five dispute resolution processes of
interest. The community participants’ ratings associated with each of
these terms is represented in the frequency distribution in Figure A.
Figure A - Frequency Distribution of Familiarity with Dispute
Resolution Processes
350

Frequency of response

300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Never heard
of term

Heard term,
but no
knowledge

Slight
knowledge
of term

Litigation

Arbitration

Facilitative Mediation

Negotiation

Some
knowledge
of term

Great deal of
knowledge
of term

Evaluative Mediation

To better reflect the construct of “awareness,” as distinguishable
from remembered knowledge, we generated two categories of community members by grouping responses: those who lacked any knowledge
of the terms and those that had at least some knowledge of the term
(see Table 2). Two of the five rating options indicated that the participant had no familiarity with the process, either because the participant had never heard the term or did not know what it meant. Adding
these frequencies together provides information about the proportion
of our participants who were unfamiliar with the dispute resolution
processes. The results indicate that as it relates to each of the terms,
11.2% of the participants indicated no familiarity with litigation,
20.1% had no familiarity with arbitration, 75.9% had no familiarity
with evaluative mediation, 75.4% had no familiarity with facilitative
mediation, and 2.7% had no familiarity with negotiation. The second
category included all of the participants who had at least slight knowledge of the term. Of our participants, 88.7% had at least slight famili-
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arity with litigation, 79.7% with arbitration, 24.0% with evaluative
mediation, 24.5% with facilitative mediation, and 97.2% with
negotiation.
Table 2 - Community Participants Categorized by Familiarity
% who lack
familiarity

% who have at least
some familiarity

Litigation

11.2%

88.7%

Arbitration

20.1%

79.7%

Evaluative Mediation

75.9%

24.0%

Facilitative Mediation

75.4%

24.5%

Negotiation

2.7%

97.2%

Dispute Resolution Process

To examine differences in familiarity across the five processes, we
also compared participants’ ratings of familiarity for each process of
interest using a statistical procedure called a repeated measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). The results indicated that there was a statistically significant difference between the processes in average
rating of familiarity, F(2.57, 1618.82) = 1164.03, p < .001. To further
understand these results, we compared the mean rating of familiarity
for each process individually to the other processes by examining
pairwise comparisons. The average ratings of familiarity for all of the
processes were significantly different from each other (all p < .001)
except for the average ratings of familiarity between evaluative and
facilitative mediation, p = .50. On average, participants rated evaluative (M = 1.81; SD = 1.00) and facilitative mediation (M = 1.83; SD =
1.03) as least familiar; arbitration (M = 3.27; SD = 0.89) and litigation
(M = 3.54; SD = 0.85) were in the middle; and negotiation was the
most familiar (M = 4.04; SD = 0.81).
2. Subjective Knowledge of Dispute Resolution Processes
In addition to asking about familiarity at the beginning of the survey, the end of the survey asked community participants how knowledgeable they were with regards to the five dispute resolution
processes of interest. Note that between the familiarity and knowledge questions, participants were asked questions that might trigger
their self-assessments of specific knowledge (what they could remember) about the processes. This may have resulted in increases or decreases in self-assessed (subjective) knowledge based on how easily or
with how much difficulty they felt they could answer the specific rating questions. The community participants’ ratings of their knowledge
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of each of the processes is represented in the frequency distribution in
Figure B. An examination of the frequency distribution indicates that
very few of our participants consider themselves knowledgeable or
very knowledgeable about any of the dispute resolution processes.
Figure B - Frequency Distribution of Knowledge of Dispute
Resolution Processes
500
450

Frequency of response

400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Not
Knowledgeable

Slightly
Knowledgeable

Moderately
Knowledgeable

Litigation

Arbitration

Facilitative Mediation

Negotiation

Knowledgeable

Very
Knowledgeable

Evaluative Mediation

Again using ANOVA, we next compared community participants’
ratings of knowledge across the five dispute resolution processes of
interest to examine possible differences in knowledge ratings. The results indicated that there was a statistically significant difference between the processes in average rating of knowledge, F(2.97, 1858.78) =
512.31, p < .001. To further understand these results, we compared
the mean rating of knowledge for each process individually to the
other processes by examining pairwise comparisons. The average ratings of knowledge for all of the processes were significantly different
from each other (all p < .001). In order of least to most knowledgeable,
participants rated themselves as least knowledgeable of evaluative
mediation (M = 1.39; SD = 0.80), then facilitative mediation (M = 1.43;
SD = 0.84), and then arbitration (M = 2.09; SD = 0.92). The community participants reported being the most knowledgeable about litigation (M = 2.35; SD = 0.98) and negotiation (M = 2.82; SD = 1.08).
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3. Experience with Dispute Resolution Processes
The survey asked the sample of community participants about
their personal experiences with the five dispute resolution processes of
interest. The initial question prompted participants to report if they
had been a participant in any of the dispute resolution processes.
Nearly half (47.2%) of the community participants reported having
participated in a negotiation. Participants reported much lower levels
of participation in litigation (17.6%), arbitration (10.9%), evaluative
mediation (4.9%), and facilitative mediation (6.2%). For the community participants who had been involved in litigation, arbitration,
evaluative mediation, or facilitative mediation, the vast majority had
only been involved in the listed dispute resolution process only once.
In addition to reporting their actual experiences, community participants were also asked to rate their overall experience level with
each of the dispute resolution processes. The community participants’
ratings of their experience levels for each of the processes are represented in the frequency distribution in Figure C. Overall, the results
indicate very low experience levels for litigation, arbitration, evaluative mediation, and facilitative mediation. However, the community
participants reported greater amounts of experience with negotiation,
similar to the self-reported participation findings reported in the previous paragraph.
Figure C - Frequency Distribution of Experience with Dispute
Resolution Processes
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Using a repeated measures ANOVA, we also compared community
participants’ ratings of experience level across the five dispute resolution processes of interest to examine differences in experience ratings.
The results indicated that there was a statistically significant difference between the processes in average rating of experience, F(2.49,
1553.88) = 252.51, p < .001. To further understand these results, we
compared the mean rating of experience for each process individually
to the other processes by examining pairwise comparisons. The average ratings of experience for all of the processes were significantly different from each other (all p < .001) except for the average ratings of
experience between evaluative and facilitative mediation, which was
marginally significant, p = .06. On average, participants rated themselves as having the least experience with evaluative (M = 1.21; SD =
0.66) and facilitative mediation (M = 1.24; SD = 0.74). They rated having significantly more experience with arbitration (M = 1.33; SD =
0.74) and then litigation (M = 1.48; SD = 0.89). Finally, the community
participants rated themselves as having the most experience with negotiation (M = 2.19; SD = 1.20).
B. Analyses Comparing Knowledgeable Community
Members’ and Experts’ Perceptions of the SelfDetermining, Voluntary, and Collaboration
Potential of Various Processes
The following subsections detail three findings from this dataset
that are reported more extensively in our other work.96 These findings
explore how community members and experts differ in their perceptions of the features of the five dispute resolution processes of interest.
We focus on comparing community members’ and experts’ perceptions
of self-determination, voluntary participation, and if the process is
collaborative.
1. Knowledgeable Community Member and Expert Perceptions of
Self-Determination
To compare community and expert participants’ perceptions of selfdetermination—operationalized as how often the parties decide how
to resolve the dispute—we ran a two-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). For this analysis, we only included community participants that reported at least some familiarity with the dispute
resolution processes examined because those who were unfamiliar
would be unable to provide meaningful responses that could be compared across processes. In total, only 86 out of the 632 community
sample participants (13.6%) reported at least some familiarity with all
five dispute resolution processes. We refer to this subsample of com96. Votruba et al., supra note 67.
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munity members in these analyses as “knowledgeable community
members” to distinguish them from the larger sample.
There was a statistically significant interaction effect between the
sample and the processes, F(2.54, 593.32) = 25.75, p < .001.97 The significant interaction indicates that the relationship between the community and expert samples’ perceptions depended upon the dispute
resolution process. Thus, we followed up these analyses with pairwise
comparisons (using one-way ANOVAs) directly comparing community
and expert participants’ perceptions for each of the dispute resolution
processes. The results indicate there was not a significant difference
between community and expert participants in perceptions of litigation and arbitration (p = .91 and p = .47, respectively). But, there were
significant differences in perceptions of evaluative mediation (F(1,
353) = 51.75, p < .001), facilitative mediation (F(1, 371) = 119.81, p <
.001), and negotiation (F(1, 811) = 29.31, p < .001). Examining the
means, it is apparent that the community participants generally perceived evaluative mediation, facilitative mediation, and negotiation as
involving less self-determination compared to the expert participants
(see Figure D).

97. The sphericity assumptions of the MANOVA model were violated, so the results
are reported using a Greenhouse-Geisser correction to the degrees of freedom as
recommended. See Hervé Abdi, The Greenhouse-Geisser Correction, ENCYC. RES.
DESIGN, 2010, at 1, 4–6. Statistical tests, including MANOVAs, must meet certain
assumptions to ensure the appropriateness of the statistical test. Because MANOVAs involve repeatedly measuring variables with the same participant, they
are particularly susceptible to violations of the assumption of sphericity. To correct for this assumption, an adjustment is made to the degrees of freedom known
as a Greenhouse-Geisser correction.
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Figure D - Self-Determination Means Comparing the Community
Member and Expert Participants

2. Knowledgeable Community Member and Expert Perceptions of
Voluntariness
Using the same statistical procedures, we also compared the community and expert participants’ perceptions of how voluntary participation is in the dispute resolution processes. Again, we conducted a
MANOVA (using a Greenhouse-Geisser correction) including only the
86 community participants that reported at least some familiarity
with all five of the dispute resolution processes. There was a statistically significant interaction effect between the sample and the
processes, F(3.31, 946.69) = 7.16, p < .001. The significant interaction
indicates that the relationship between the community and expert
samples’ perceptions depended upon the dispute resolution process.
Thus, we followed up these analyses with pairwise comparisons directly comparing community and expert participants’ perceptions for
each of the dispute resolution processes. The results indicate there
was not a significant difference between community and expert participants in perceptions regarding how voluntary participation in arbitration is (p = .27). But, there were significant differences in
perceptions of voluntariness for litigation, (F(1, 736) = 15.78, p < .001),
evaluative mediation (F(1, 347) = 21.48, p < .001), facilitative mediation (F(1, 367) = 42.00, p < .001), and negotiation (F(1, 819) = 5.63, p =
.02). Examining the means, it is apparent that the community participants generally perceived participation in litigation, evaluative mediation, facilitative mediation, and negotiation as less voluntary
compared to the expert participants (see Figure E).
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Figure E - Voluntariness Means Comparing the Community
Member and Expert Participants

3. Knowledgeable Community Member and Expert Perceptions of
Collaboration Potential
Finally, we also compared the community and expert participants’
perceptions of how collaborative the dispute resolution processes are
with regards to the parties working together to reach a solution.
Again, we conducted a MANOVA (using a Greenhouse-Geisser correction) including only the 86 community participants that reported at
least some familiarity with all five of the dispute resolution processes.
There was a statistically significant interaction effect between the
sample and the processes, F(2.90, 684.82) = 28.18, p < .001. The significant interaction indicates that the relationship between the community and expert samples’ perceptions depended upon the dispute
resolution process. Thus, we followed up these analyses with pairwise
comparisons directly comparing community and expert participants’
perceptions for each of the dispute resolution processes. The results
indicate there was not a significant difference between community
and expert participants in how collaborative they perceived litigation
(p = .66) or evaluative mediation (p = .09). But, there were significant
differences in perceptions of how collaborative the process is for arbitration (F(1, 637) = 76.12, p < .001), facilitative mediation (F(1, 378) =
43.21, p < .001), and negotiation (F(1, 828) = 6.31, p = .01). As shown
by the means, the community participants perceived arbitration and
negotiation as more collaborative processes compared to the experts.
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But the community sample perceived facilitative mediation as less collaborative than the experts (see Figure F).
Figure F - Collaborative Means Comparing the Community Member
and Expert Participants

C. Discussion of Results
While our primary objective at the start of this data collection effort was to confirm and clarify the understanding of what mediation,
arbitration, and negotiation are, we also uncovered significant potential gaps in the public’s understanding of ADR processes, as indicated
by differences between public and expert ratings. These gaps should
have significant impacts on how lawyers, neutrals, and court systems
operate, both ethically and practically. In our examination of community participants’ familiarity with, knowledge of, and experience with
dispute resolution mechanisms, there were a number of noteworthy
findings. First, pertaining to familiarity, nearly all of the community
participants had at least some familiarity with negotiation. Self-reported knowledge of each of the processes also indicated that the community member participants perceived themselves as most
knowledgeable about negotiation. This finding makes sense in light of
the fact that most people engage in informal negotiations every day98
and many have negotiated significant transactions such as purchasing
98. BLANKLEY & WESTON, supra note 6, at 29 (“Often, people are unaware that they
are ‘negotiating,’ they negotiate out of instinct . . . .”).
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homes or cars, or negotiating a salary or raise.99 Everyday person-toperson transactions have moved from the classifieds to forums such as
Facebook Marketplace, Craigslist, and Poshmark, with no shortage of
internet blogs teaching readers how to negotiate in these forums.100
Books relating to negotiation are abundant to lay audiences,101 including a book on negotiation written by a United States President.102
For these reasons, the community participants’ familiarity with and
knowledge of negotiation is unsurprising.
The large majority of community member participants also indicated at least some familiarity with litigation and arbitration. With
regards to self-assessed ratings of knowledge, the average ratings indicated litigation was the second most understood dispute resolution
process and arbitration was the third most understood. Litigation is
considered a default method of dispute resolution in the United
States, and the “A” in ADR stands for “alternative” to litigation.103
Litigation is commonly portrayed in popular media such as TV shows,
movies, and novels. The participants’ familiarity with litigation was
expected given its prominence in popular culture in the United States.
The participants’ higher levels of familiarity with and knowledge of
arbitration is somewhat surprising, but likely explainable. Arbitration
agreements are now commonplace in contracts for cellular telephone
and banking services.104 Some members of the public may also be fa99. See Andrea Kumpfer Schneider et al., The Definition of Negotiation: A Play in
Three Acts, 2017 J. DISP. RESOL. 15, 15–16 (2017) (describing major work requests, such as maternity leave and international travel, as “absolutely” a
negotiation).
100. See, e.g., Dave Ramsey, How to Haggle for a Good Bargain, RAMSEY, https://
www.daveramsey.com/blog/how-to-negotiate-a-bargain [https://perma.unl.edu/
TC46-H9RW] (last visited Aug. 24, 2020) (discussing tips for both in-person and
online transactions).
101. See generally ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (3d ed. 2011) (providing five key
ideas for negotiation).
102. DONALD J. TRUMP & TONY SCHWARTZ, TRUMP: THE ART OF THE DEAL (1987).
103. See, e.g., Maurits Barendrecht & Berend R. de Vries, Fitting the Forum to the
Fuss with Sticky Defaults: Failure in the Market for Dispute Resolution Services?,
7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 83, 100 (2005) (“Faced with a proposal for an alternative dispute resolution method, the parties will compare the proposed
method with the default method of litigation.”); Thomas J. Stipanowich & J. Ryan
Lamare, Living with ADR: Evolving Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration, and Conflict Management in Fortune 100 Companies, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 1, 30 (2014) (“Many commentators now frequently use the adjective ‘appropriate,’ signaling a shift from a litigation default to an emphasis on what techniques are suitable to the circumstances.”).
104. See, e.g., Amy J. Schmitz, Curing Consumer Warranty Woes Through Regulated
Arbitration, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 627, 627 (2008) (“Un-negotiated form
arbitration provisions have become accepted reality in consumer contracts in the
United States. Consumers can expect to find these form arbitration clauses in
everything from McDonald’s contest rules and medical services handbooks to
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miliar with arbitration from nationwide press regarding some of the
negative aspects of arbitration,105 or even from sports media reporting
on salary or grievance arbitration in the major sports leagues in the
United States or within the Olympics.106 Arbitration is also a common
dispute resolution process in collective bargaining agreements,107 and
those employed in unionized workplaces or industries may be familiar
with the process.
However, only about a quarter of the participants reported having
at least some familiarity with evaluative mediation or facilitative mediation. Community participants’ self-reported ratings also indicated
low levels of knowledge for both of these processes. The low familiarity
and knowledge may be attributable to at least two things. In the
United States, mediation is the newest of these five types of dispute
resolution, with many scholars dating the mediation revolution to the
Pound Conference and community dispute resolution in the 1960s.108
As it relates to the general population, mediation is most common in
family law disputes, with mandatory and voluntary mediation programs in roughly half of the United States.109 Mediation has had only
limited exposure in the news and popular media. The other reason
that may have led to low familiarity is the addition of the words
“facilitative” and “evaluative” before the word “mediation.” It is cer-

105.

106.

107.

108.
109.

computer purchase terms and pest control contracts. Most . . . credit card companies now require arbitration . . . .”).
In 2015, the New York Times published a trilogy of articles on arbitration. See
Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, In Religious Arbitration, Scripture
Is the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/
03/business/dealbook/in-religious-arbitration-scripture-is-the-rule-of-law.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/9JSY-QL8E]; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff,
Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywherestacking-the-deck-of-justice.html?_r=0 [https://perma.unl.edu/E7SV-VZKK]; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, In Arbitration, a “Privatization of the
Justice System,” N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/
business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-justice-system.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/4ND5-2SHR].
See generally Symposium, Sports Law and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 3 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3 (2001) (giving overview of arbitration in professional and Olympic sports); Maureen A. Weston, Doping Control, Mandatory
Arbitration, and Process Dangers for Accused Athletes in International Sports, 10
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 5, 5 (2009) (“As a condition of participating in international sporting competition, athletes generally waive rights to judicial recourse in
their national courts and agree to mandatory arbitration of disputes regarding
eligibility or discipline to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).”).
See, e.g., William B. Gould IV, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards—
Thirty Years of the Steelworkers Trilogy: The Aftermath of AT&T and Misco, 64
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 464, 464–66 (1989) (discussing the legal history surrounding
collective bargaining agreements and arbitration’s place in that history).
See Traum & Farkas, supra note 1.
FAMILY JUSTICE INSTITUTE, WHAT STATE STATUTES TELL US ABOUT THE LANDSCAPE OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 2–4 (2018) (on file with author).
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tainly possible that the community sample was familiar with “mediation” as a general term but not when qualified by another term. When
constructing the survey, we chose to differentiate between mediation
models given that they differed on some of the features we were assessing, and we suspected not differentiating them would make it difficult for experts who knew of the subtypes to otherwise rate the
features.
The study also inquired about the community participants’ direct
experience with the five dispute resolution processes. The frequency
distribution in Figure C highlights that the vast majority of the community participants have no experience with litigation, arbitration,
evaluative mediation, or facilitative mediation. The one dispute resolution process that a larger number of participants had experience
with was negotiation. Again, this makes sense because most people
engage in informal negotiations every day and have at least some experience engaging in significant negotiations involving larger
purchases and salaries. Overall, the community participants were
least experienced with evaluative mediation and facilitative mediation, followed by arbitration and litigation; they had the most experience with negotiation.
The final set of analyses directly compared the expert sample with
the subset of our community sample that had indicated at least slight
familiarity with all of the dispute resolution processes included in the
analyses. These comparisons move beyond assessments of familiarity
and subjective knowledge and begin to clarify the nature of public understanding of different processes, including how public understanding may differ from expert assessments of the processes. We compared
the experts and these potentially more knowledgeable community
members on their perceptions of how often the dispute resolution
processes involved self-determination, are voluntary, and allow for
collaborative solutions. Although our other paper focuses on a wide
array of dispute resolution process features, we chose to include these
select features in this Article because of their implications for ethics
and practice. It is also notable that in our questions to the participants
(as described in the methods section supra), we asked about each of
these features without using the specific terms in order to avoid the
question simply being a test of dispute resolution vocabulary. For example, the question about self-determination was framed as the parties deciding for themselves how to resolve the dispute.
The comparison of knowledgeable community members’ and experts’ perceptions of self-determination indicated that there were no
differences in how they perceived self-determination in litigation and
arbitration. However, there was a difference in expert and community
perceptions of self-determination for evaluative mediation, facilitative
mediation, and negotiation. In general, the community participants
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perceived them as being lower in self-determination compared to experts. Similar results were observed for perceptions of how often participation in each of the dispute resolution processes is voluntary.
Although there were no observed differences for perceptions of arbitration, the community participants generally perceived participation
in litigation, evaluative mediation, facilitative mediation, and negotiation as less voluntary compared to the expert participants. The results
on perceptions of how often each the processes involved collaborative
solutions were somewhat different. This time, there were no differences in perceptions for litigation and evaluative mediation. However,
the community participants perceived arbitration and negotiation as
more often a collaborative process compared to the experts. But, the
community sample perceived facilitative mediation as less collaborative than the experts.
As for our larger project, the results suggest that experts in the
field of dispute resolution share a common understanding of the key
features of different processes.110 This is not the case for the community sample. Community members generally show less agreement
(more variability) in their understanding of the prevalence of the key
features for the processes we examined. Further, the community samples’ responses often significantly differ from the experts’. These findings are particularly interesting when considering ethics, as this
example shows that even when community participants indicated
they had familiarity with dispute resolution processes, such as mediation, their assessments did not always correspond with expert assessments. Examining perceptions of self-determination, mediation
appears to be the most commonly misunderstood process based on this
question and others in our larger analysis.111 In general, the comparison of experts’ and community members’ perceptions of the features of
dispute resolution processes points to the fact that even the community members who indicate familiarity with all of the processes misunderstand important features of those processes.112
VI.

IMPLICATIONS FOR LAWYERS – ETHICAL AND
PROCESS-BASED

So far, this Article has considered the importance of studying the
public’s understanding of ADR processes by considering the literature
on the psychology of knowledge, reviewing past research on what the
general public knows about ADR processes, and detailing the results
of the current study on community members’ knowledge of ADR
processes. Generally, the results suggest significant gaps in the pub110. Votruba et al., supra note 67.
111. Id.
112. Id.

2021]

ADR IS NOT A HOUSEHOLD TERM

829

lic’s understanding of ADR processes. These gaps potentially impact
how lawyers, neutrals, and court systems should operate, both ethically and practically. This Part considers the ethical and processbased implications of the reviewed literature and the current study
findings for lawyers, neutrals, and court systems. We recognize that
lawyers likely vary on how much they view their role as educational.
Clients, too, will vary on their experience with various processes, sophistication level, and desire to know more about process options. Yet,
we hope this discussion offers an opportunity to critically examine legal practitioners’ assumptions regarding their clients’ knowledge of
ADR processes and the ethical and practical consequences of those
assumptions.
This Part is divided in two sections. The first section considers how
the results of this study impact legal ethics. The second section considers how these results could impact current philosophies relating to client counseling and informed consent.
A. Implications Relating to Legal Ethics
Although we did not create this study specifically with legal ethics
in mind, the results implicate ethical practice. Because this study suggests that the general population has fairly limited knowledge and experience with dispute resolution processes, as well as misconceptions
about the essential nature of dispute resolution processes, lawyers
may need to reconsider their ethical duties to their clients to ensure
their clients have the proper information to give informed consent regarding the course of the representation. In addition, this research
might shape how lawyers view the traditional duty regarding the
choices made in a representation—the “means/ends” divide. Finally,
this section revives an important question: Should lawyers have an
ethical duty to counsel their clients regarding ADR options?
1. Ethics and Communication with Clients
This study shows that a majority of the public lacks familiarity
with, knowledge of, and experience with the processes of evaluative
and facilitative mediation. Even those who claimed knowledge of these
processes have differing perceptions of the fundamental features (e.g.,
self-determination) of the processes compared to the expert sample.113
Further, although our participants indicated greater familiarity with,
knowledge of, and experience with litigation and arbitration, the numbers are still rather low. Based on these findings, attorneys may need
to dedicate additional attention to advising their clients on what they
can expect regarding ADR processes.
113. See supra Part V.
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Communication with clients is among the fundamental duties of a
lawyer.114 Clients expect robust communication from their advocates,
and lack of communication is a common theme in malpractice actions.115 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct deal with the lawyer’s duty to keep a client informed in a number of places. Most
notably, Model Rule 1.4, titled “Communications,” states, in part:
(a) A lawyer shall:
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to
which the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e), is required by
these Rules;
(2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client’s
objectives are to be accomplished;
(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; [and]
(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information[.]
....
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.116

Nearly every state has adopted this rule, and the states that did not
have their own communication rules.117 The first comment to this
Rule notes that “[r]easonable communication between the lawyer and
client is necessary for the client effectively to participate in the representation.”118 Under Rule 1.4(a)(2), the communication rule requires
consultation regarding the “means by which the client’s objectives are
114. See In re Michael A. Joseph, 56 V.I. 490, 505 (2012) (“As we have previously explained, the duties set forth in Model Rules 1.1, 1.3, and 1.4 are among the most
important ethical duties owed by a lawyer.”). Rule 1.1 deals with competency,
Rule 1.3 deals with diligence, and Rule 1.4 concerns communication. As the Joseph court notes, these three rules are fundamental to law practice. Id.
115. Sarah Burkey, Note, Model Rule 1.4: Why Telling Lawyers to “Communicate
More” Is Not Enough, 31 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 545, 546 (2018) (“Indeed, lawyers
are constantly sued by their own clients for their alleged failure to
communicate.”).
116. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (emphasis added). The
Model Rules included the first ethical responsibility centered on communication.
This rule does not have a counterpart in the old Model Code of Professional Responsibility. See Nancy J. Moore, “Why Is There No Clear Doctrine of Informed
Consent for Lawyers?,” 47 U. TOL. L. REV. 133, 141 (2015) (noting that the 1983
Rules not only mandated, for the first time, “that lawyers must communicate
with their clients” but “also provided for expansive duties both to communicate
regularly and to explain matters sufficiently to permit clients to make ‘informed
decisions’ concerning the course of the representation.”).
117. Burkey, supra note 115, at 547–49 (describing the adoption of Rule 1.4 and the
similar rules in states that did not adopt the Model Rules); see also Lucian T.
Pera, Grading ABA Leadership on Legal Ethics Leadership: State Adoption of the
Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 637,
672–73 (2005) (noting early adoptions of Rule 1.4, including many states that
adopted Rule 1.4 verbatim).
118. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (emphasis
added).
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to be accomplished,”119 even though the means are usually considered
to be in the realm of the lawyer’s decision-making authority.120
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not specify the exact
amount or quality of communication necessary, and “communication”
is not a defined term in the Rules.121 Comment 5 gives some guidance:
The client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by
which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do
so. Adequacy of communication depends in part on the kind of advice or assistance that is involved.122

This comment, however, additionally notes that “a lawyer ordinarily
will not be expected to describe . . . negotiation strategy.”123 Although
a lawyer need not explain every detail of negotiation strategy, a lawyer may need to consult with their client about some process issues,
particularly if the client’s interests implicate process choice. For example, if a client in a probate dispute mentions a goal of reconciling
with an estranged sibling, the lawyer may need to communicate with
the client about processes that would achieve that goal (and those that
would not).124 In this probate example, the adversarial nature of litigation and arbitration could make the relationship between the siblings increasingly strained. In mediation and negotiation, however,
the flexible nature of the process and ability to discuss non-legal topics
and outcomes may be better suited to meet the need of the client for
reconciliation.
The ABA adopted the addition of the words “informed consent” in
Rule 1.4(a) in the 2000 version of the Model Rules;125 however, by its
text, lawyers need not obtain informed consent regarding every aspect
that requires communication.126 Where informed consent is required,
119. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
120. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (“Clients
normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to
the means to be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to
technical, legal and tactical matters.”).
121. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2012); see
also Luis Miguel Dickson, Advice About Immunity: Ethical Conflict in Garcetti
Advice-Giving, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 795, 808 (2009) (“Model Rule 1.4 governs
communication between the client and the lawyer. Model Rule 1.4(a)(2) and
Model Rule 1.4(b), taken together, imply that a lawyer has an ethical duty to
reasonably communicate with a client.”).
122. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (emphasis
added).
123. Id.
124. See infra subsection VI.A.3 for additional discussion on a duty to advise a client
regarding non-litigation options.
125. Moore, supra note 116, at 149–51 (discussing the adoption and changes to Rule
1.4 as part of the Ethics 2000 commission).
126. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002); Moore, supra note
116, at 151 (“An unintended consequence of the Commission’s decision, however,
is that lawyers looking for guidance in the context of decision making under Rule
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the term is robust, defined as “the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate
information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.”127 Lawyers, of course, may provide robust communication with their clients
even when informed consent is not required, and the rules of professional conduct are minimum standards, neither aspirational nor best
practices.128
In sum, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct indicate that lawyer-client communication must be sufficient enough that the client
can “make informed decisions regarding representation”129 and “participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued.”130 The
public’s general lack of knowledge of ADR processes indicates that
lawyers may often need to address significant gaps in their clients’
understanding of ADR processes to ensure their clients are adequately
informed to make these decisions.
These gaps are likely significant for two reasons. First, the current
study suggests an overwhelming dearth of knowledge regarding ADR
processes, particularly for evaluative and facilitative mediation.131
The majority of the community participants lacked familiarity with,
knowledge of, and experience with these processes. This suggests that
lawyers should not assume that a client, particularly a new client, has
any familiarity with or knowledge about possible ADR processes. Nor
should lawyers expect that their clients have enough knowledge to initiate a conversation about alternative dispute resolution. Further, our
results suggest that clients may actually have some misunderstandings of ADR processes that their lawyer may need to correct. To best
advise their clients, lawyers may need to initiate a conversation on the
topic, assume their client has no knowledge of ADR processes, and be
prepared to correct misinformation even if their client does report
some knowledge.
Second, Bloom’s taxonomy of knowledge suggests that being able to
evaluate and choose between different dispute resolution processes

127.
128.

129.
130.
131.

1.4(b) will not be referred to Rule 1.0(e), which provides an expansive definition of
the term ‘informed consent.’ ”).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
Clio, a popular law office practice software company, conducted a study in 2018 of
lawyers, law firms, and clients to determine trends in provision of legal services.
CLIO, LEGAL TRENDS REPORT 6 (2018), https://www.clio.com/resources/legaltrends/2018-report/ [https://perma.unl.edu/W2AU-X3WT]. Among other findings,
the report notes that attorneys and clients have different expectations regarding
modes and frequency of communication. Id. at 36–45.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
See supra section V.A.
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will likely require multiple levels of knowledge including awareness of
the process options, remembering those options, distinguishing between the options along the relevant dimensions, understanding and
analyzing the implications of those options, and, finally, applying comparisons between the options to the specific situation.132 All of this is
to say that making informed, intelligent decisions requires a high
level of knowledge and communication. To achieve this high level, attorneys will need to devote considerable time, energy, and thought to
adequately and appropriately communicating with their clients. Admittedly, this is not easy to do. Lawyers—for legitimate reasons including time and cost efficiency, as well as overwhelming caseloads—
often have limited time to communicate with their clients.133 Further,
as experts, it may be difficult for lawyers to appreciate the vast discrepancy between their and their clients’ understanding of ADR
processes.
For some lawyers, implementing these practices will require a
change in how they counsel and educate clients, and the lawyers
themselves may need additional training on how to provide the required information for clients to make informed decisions. Over the
last few decades, law schools have provided increasing training for
new lawyers in counseling, negotiation, ADR, and experiential learning, which should help provide initial training.134 Now that we better
understand the public’s level of unfamiliarity with these processes, it
can be argued that these courses could add additional training on
counseling regarding ADR options. For current lawyers, educational
programs regarding counseling clients as to their process options may
equip lawyers with new tools for advising and counseling clients.
2. Ethics and Division of Responsibility Between Attorney and
Client
This study also has implications under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2, which governs the division of roles and responsibilities between the lawyer and client.135 Given the lay
population’s misunderstanding of key features of dispute resolution
processes, the division of authority between lawyers and clients may
need reconsideration. As noted above,136 increased communication
132. See generally Anderson & Krathwohl, supra note 33.
133. See, e.g., Rodney J. Uphoff, Relations Between Lawyer and Client in Damages:
Model, Typical, or Dysfunctional?, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 145, 163–64 (2004) (suggesting that high workloads for lawyers, among other factors, may limit the
amount of time they may have available to counsel clients).
134. Lande, supra note 7, at 128–32 (describing the need for continuing a robust program of ADR within the legal academy).
135. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
136. See supra subsection VI.A.1.

834

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:797

may alleviate many of the potential concerns regarding this knowledge gap.
Rule 1.2 divides the responsibility of the attorney–client relationship between the attorney and the client. Although not explicit, many
lawyers read this rule as having a “means” and “ends” distinction, i.e.,
the client decides the objectives, or the ends, and the lawyer determines how the objectives are met, or the means.137 Rule 1.2(a) requires that a lawyer “abide by a client’s decisions concerning the
objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult
with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.”138
Read together, Rules 1.2 and 1.4 prioritize healthy communication between attorney and client regarding the “means,” or the process and
strategy choices, made by a lawyer during the course of a representation.139 Additionally, Rule 1.2(a) places the decision of whether to settle specifically in the hands of the client.140
Comment 2 to Rule 1.2 elaborates on the means–ends distinction
and notes the possibility that attorneys and clients may disagree on
the proper “means” to be employed by the lawyer.141 The comment
notes that clients “normally defer” to lawyers’ decisions regarding
“technical, legal and tactical matters.”142 In the event of a disagreement, lawyers are encouraged to consult with their clients and “seek a
mutually acceptable resolution” on the proper course of the representation.143 The comment does not specifically state who makes the final
decision in the event of disagreement.144 Scholars note that while
137. See Moore, supra note 116, at 140 (noting that the Model Code implicitly maintained the “division of decisions into objectives and means”).
138. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (emphasis
added).
139. The comments to Rule 1.2 also cross-reference Rule 1.4, again noting the communication requirements. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2002) (“With respect to the means by which the client’s objectives are to be
pursued, the lawyer shall consult with the client as required by Rule 1.4(a)(2) and
may take such action as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation.”).
140. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
141. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
142. Id.
143. Id. The comment does not prescribe how such disagreements should be resolved,
id., and notes the possibility that the lawyer may need to withdraw from the
representation if the disagreement cannot be resolved. Id. (citing Model Rule
1.16(b)(4), concerning withdrawal from representation). In addition, this comment in particular might not carry the threat of discipline if a serious disagreement arose regarding the course of the representation. See Moore, supra note
116, at 141 (noting that the comments to Rule 1.2 “could easily be taken as
merely a suggestion of what lawyers ordinarily ought (morally) to do, not what
they are required to do under penalty of discipline”).
144. See Nina Varsava et al., Allocating Authority Between Lawyers and Their Clients
After McCoy v. Louisiana, 23 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 170, 176 (2020) (stating that
when it comes to disagreements over means decisions, the Model Rule “implicitly
leaves ultimate authority over these decisions to the attorney”).
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Rule 1.2(a) may be fundamental to law practice, its parameters are
difficult to define and specific guidance is lacking.145
In the criminal context, some authority exists to support the idea
that defendants may be able to dictate certain procedural decisions,
although the case law is hardly unanimous.146 The United States Supreme Court recently held that the choice to maintain one’s innocence,
despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, is “not [a] strategic
choice[ ] about how best to achieve a client’s objectives; they are
choices about what the client’s objectives in fact are.”147 The Supreme
Court did not limit what a client’s objectives may be, which raises an
additional question: What if the client’s objectives implicate elements
of procedure?
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers has a
slightly broader view of the realm of choices within the client’s control.
The comments note that some decisions are “so vital” to clients that
they would reasonably expect that their lawyers would abide by
them.148 The Restatement, however, neither defines those decisions
nor provides examples.149
Given the results of this study, it is difficult to imagine many clients suggesting that they, or their lawyers, utilize processes alternative to litigation or negotiation. In an early study, Professor Wissler
opined that the low utilization of voluntary ADR programs might be
due, in part, to participants’ unfamiliarity with these processes.150 If
clients are unfamiliar with ADR processes, as our study suggests, they
will be less likely to request those processes in conversations with
their attorneys or the court.151
145. See Moore, supra note 116, at 141 (noting that parts of this rule may be more
aspirational than the basis for discipline); Varsava et al., supra note 144, at 172
(“The Model Rules offer insufficient guidance in this area and fail to reflect the
everyday reality of lawyering.”).
146. See Varsava et al., supra note 144, at 177–78 (describing this area of law as a
“confounding patchwork of rules that are difficult to justify under a consistent set
of principles”).
147. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1508 (2018). Although the decision to assert
guilt or innocence may appear to be one that would always be objective, not an
end, this particular case involved overwhelming evidence of guilt. Id. Because of
these circumstances, counsel considered the decision to admit guilt to be a strategic one that may lead to leniency in the sentencing phase of the case. Id. at 1508
(“Counsel may reasonably assess a concession of guilt as best suited to avoiding
the death penalty, as English did in this case.”).
148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 22 cmt. b (AM. LAW
INST. 2000).
149. The Restatement further notes that one of the factors in determining whether a
client makes a given decision is “how important the decision is for the client . . . .”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 22 cmt. e.
150. Wissler, supra note 26, at 203.
151. Id. at 204 (“Two recent studies confirm that ADR use often is not clientinitiated.”).
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Even without an express desire by a client to participate in a process, scholars considered whether certain strategies are “ends” in
themselves. Professor Robert Burns suggests that negotiating strategy may be an “end” for a given client, particularly in integrative bargaining situations.152 When lawyers consider client interests, as
defined in Getting to Yes,153 lawyers may find that more client “ends”
implicate traditional lawyer “means.” Professor Robert Cochran argued that the means chosen will “have a significant impact on the client’s time and money, the client’s relationship with the opposing
party, the ultimate result of the representation, and the client’s privacy and personal satisfaction,”154 and Professor Shestowsky asserts
that client “preferences should guide which procedures” lawyers employ in a given case.155 These interests can be extraordinarily important to the client, making the “means–ends” analysis difficult. Overall,
though, to the extent clients are even slightly engaged in choosing between procedures, it is essential that the clients are made aware of
and understand the details of the various procedures well enough to
evaluate those procedures and choose between them. Again, this suggests that lawyers may need to provide the necessary education and
potentially correct misperceptions.
3. Ethical Duty to Counsel Clients Regarding ADR Options
The results of this study may give new vigor to those practitioners
and scholars calling for an ethical obligation to counsel clients on process issues, particularly alternatives to litigation. The Model Rules
themselves do not impose such an explicit duty, but Comment 5 to
Rule 2.1 states that “when a matter is likely to involve litigation, it
may be necessary under Rule 1.4 to inform the client of forms of dispute resolution that might constitute reasonable alternatives to litigation.”156 Although the text of Rule 2.1 does not mention alternative
152. Robert P. Burns, Some Ethical Issues Surrounding Mediation, 70 FORDHAM L.
REV. 691, 699 (2001) (noting as an example that a client may have a strong desire
that the negotiation follow certain norms, such as stringent ethical considerations, such that they are better classified as “ends” rather than “means.”); see also
Marshall J. Breger, Should an Attorney Be Required to Advise a Client of ADR
Options?, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427, 436–37 (2000) (considering whether the
decision to choose among ADR options is an “ends” or a “means.”).
153. FISHER ET AL., supra note 101 (describing interests as the underlying motivation
for why a person asserts a given position).
154. Robert F. Cochran Jr., Professional Rules and ADR: Control of Alternative Dispute Resolution Under the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission Proposal and Other Professional Responsibility Standards, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 895, 898 (2001).
155. Shestowsky, Ignorance, supra note 45, at 194.
156. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). The ABA
added this comment as part of the Ethics 2000 Commission, ultimately adopted
by the ABA in 2002. Id. For a redlined version of Rule 2.1 showing the changes
from the Ethics 2000 Commission, see Rule 2.1, AM. B. ASS’N (Apr. 10, 2020),
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forms of dispute resolution, it does allow a lawyer to counsel clients on
a wide variety of non-legal factors, such as “moral, economic, social
and political factors.”157 To the extent that a jurisdiction has adopted
a duty to advise clients of ADR options, those rules are often limited to
a specific jurisdiction, such as a federal district or a county.158
Many commentators have urged that regulatory authorities specifically require litigation attorneys to counsel clients on ADR options. In
2001, Professor Douglas Yarn argued:
There are many reasons for such a duty, most of which are based on the general obligation of attorneys to inform clients of their legal options. An ethical
duty to advise on ADR is arguably inherent in the fiduciary duty owed by an
attorney to his principal. As ADR becomes increasingly prevalent and more
integrated into the legal mainstream, it becomes less easy to avoid when representing a client. . . . Analogizing to informed consent or the duty to relay
settlement offers, clients need to know the benefits and risks of choosing a
particular dispute resolution process, whether litigation or mediation. At a
slightly more esoteric level, there should be a duty to advise in order to promote the development of ADR as a public good. If ADR has public benefits of
increasing access to justice, preserving judicial resources by reducing overcrowded court dockets, empowering communities, etc., then imposition of the
norm promotes the public good.159
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_commission/e2k_rule21/ [https://perma.unl.edu/SL2P-BZXZ]. Some
scholars have questioned the placement of this idea in the comments of Rule 2.1
rather than the text, particularly given that Rule 1.4 does not specifically require
such counseling and discussion. Gerald F. Phillips, The Obligation of Attorneys to
Inform Clients About ADR, 31 W. ST. U. L. REV. 239, 242 (2004) (noting that
Professor Robert Cochran found the cross references between Rules 1.4 and 2.1
create a circle leading nowhere).
157. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
158. Breger, supra note 152, at 463–65 (listing jurisdictions with a requirement that
attorney counsel clients regarding ADR, but most of the requirements are local
and not statewide); see also Kristen M. Blankley, The Ethics and Practice of
Drafting Pre-Dispute Resolution Clauses, 49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 743, 748–49
(2016) (discussing the duty to advise); Shestowsky, Ignorance, supra note 45, at
200–02 (summarizing state and local laws). Colorado is among a small minority
of states that advise lawyers to counsel clients about ADR options in litigated
cases within the text of its rules. COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (2020)
(“In a matter involving or expected to involve litigation, a lawyer should advise
the client of alternative forms of dispute resolution that might reasonably be pursued to attempt to resolve the legal dispute or to reach the legal objective
sought.”). Oregon, California, and Massachusetts have taken a different approach—requiring courts and clerks to provide ADR information to the litigants.
See Becky L. Jacobs, Mandatory ADR Notice Requirements: Gender Themes and
Intentionality in Policy Discourse, 22 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2016) (discussing state requirements).
159. Douglas H. Yarn, Lawyer Ethics in ADR and the Recommendations of Ethics 2000
to Revise the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Considerations for Adoption
and State Application, 54 ARK. L. REV. 207, 246–47 (2001) (footnotes omitted); see
Robert F. Cochran, Jr., ADR, the ABA, and Client Control: A Proposal that the
Model Rules Require Lawyers to Present ADR Options to Clients, 41 S. TEX. L.
REV. 183 (1999); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Legal Representation and the Next Steps
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Although not explicitly in the rules, some commentators find such a
duty implied in Rules 2.1, 1.4, and their comments.160 A new philosophy on this topic suggests that lawyers should advise clients about
ADR options because legal training makes lawyers uniquely qualified
to solve problems, “discern the issues in controversy, and build consensus around resolution.”161 Given the practical reality that few
cases go to trial,162 advising clients about how their cases will likely
be resolved is an additional reason for lawyers to have a specific duty
to counsel about these options.163
The duty to counsel clients regarding ADR options also has downsides. First, lawyers would need to become competent in these areas
and proficient in explaining these options to clients.164 In addition, if
counseling clients regarding ADR options becomes a matter of professional ethics, liability may follow if a lawyer does not engage in this

160.

161.
162.
163.

164.

Toward Client Control: Attorney Malpractice for the Failure to Allow the Client to
Control Negotiation and Pursue Alternatives to Litigation, 47 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 819 (1990); Frank E.A. Sander & Michael L. Prigoff, Professional Responsibility: Should There Be a Duty to Advise of ADR Options?, 76 ABA J. 50 (1990);
Carol VanAuken-Haight & Pamela Chapman Enslen, Attorney Duty to Inform
Clients of ADR?, 72 MICH. B.J. 1038 (1993); Monica L. Warmbrod, Could an Attorney Face Disciplinary Actions or Even Legal Malpractice Liability for Failure
to Inform Clients of Alternative Dispute Resolution?, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 791 (1997);
see also Christopher M. Fairman, Protecting Consumers: Attorney Ethics and the
Law Governing Lawyers, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 529, 544 (2006) (“Because
of the central importance of client choice, many scholars believe that there should
be an express mandatory duty to advise clients of ADR options. Such a requirement, however, is largely absent from the ethical codes.” (footnote omitted)).
Katerina P. Lewinbuk, First, Do No Harm: The Consequences of Advising Clients
About Litigation Alternatives in Medical Malpractice Cases, 2 ST. MARY’S J. ON
LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 416, 429–30 (2012) (outlining the argument that a
duty to advise about ADR options is implicit in the Model Rules).
Kristin L. Fortin, Reviving the Lawyer’s Role as Servant Leader: The Professional
Paradigm and a Lawyer’s Ethical Obligation to Inform Clients About Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 589, 615 (2009).
Lewinbuk, supra note 160, at 425–26 (stating that less than 3% of cases go to
trial).
Graham K. Bryant & Kristopher R. McClellan, The Disappearing Civil Trial: Implications for the Future of Law Practice, 30 REGENT U. L. REV. 287, 321 (2017)
(“Lawyers, therefore, have an ethical duty to understand the options of ADR and
litigation in order to competently advise clients about which course to pursue.”);
Kimberlee K. Kovach, The Duty to Disclose Litigation Risks and Opportunities for
Settlement: The Essence of Informed Decision-Making, 33 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 71,
86 (2011) (“From contractual pre-dispute arbitration clauses to court mandated
mediation, most cases, at least in several jurisdictions, are resolved through mediation or arbitration. As a consequence, lawyers are obligated to inform clients
at the initial stages of representation that these options not only exist, but that it
is quite likely that they will be participating in them.” (footnotes omitted)).
Bryant & McClellan, supra note 163; Kovach, supra note 163; see also Wissler,
Barriers, supra note 63, at 463–69 (discussing the idea that a lawyer’s own
knowledge of ADR is a barrier to widespread counseling regarding these
processes).
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counseling.165 As noted above, whether process choices are “means” or
“ends” is a difficult analysis,166 and regulatory authorities may choose
not to expose lawyers to potential liability for failing to explain choices
that might be within the realm of lawyers to make.
Even without a specific ethical mandate to counsel clients about
ADR options (outside of specific jurisdictions), some empirical evidence shows that many lawyers do incorporate discussions of ADR
with their clients.167 Professor Shestowsky’s work suggests that clients who do participate in mediation, for example, do so at their lawyers’ recommendations.168 The studies to date, however, have focused
on what lawyers do and say, not what clients hear or understand.169
Our research considers the depth of knowledge of ADR processes by
the general public, but we do not know where the survey takers received their knowledge—whether from lawyers, family members, television shows, or other sources.
To the extent that this study shows lack of knowledge, we would
not expect clients to initiate a discussion of ADR options with their
lawyers. Therefore, an explicit ethical requirement on lawyers to
counsel their clients on ADR options could lead to more informed decision-making by clients regarding the processes that they want to utilize. If clients better understood their process options, they could
theoretically make better decisions on how to resolve their dispute to
best meet their needs.

165. See Lewinbuk, supra note 160, at 434–35 (warning of a potential to expose lawyers to liability if a duty to counsel on ADR options is specifically incorporated
into the Rules); Warmbrod, supra note 159, at 814–15 (discussing possibility of
liability for failure to advise). ADR pioneer Frank Sander suggested that a duty
to counsel clients regarding ADR could be satisfied by something as commonplace
as handing a client a brochure outlining ADR options. Sander & Prigoff, supra
note 159, at 50. Whether counseling through the provision of a brochure is an
acceptable way to satisfy this theoretical duty is a topic outside the scope of this
Article.
166. See supra subsection VI.A.2.
167. See Wissler, Barriers, supra note 63; Wissler, supra note 26.
168. See Donna Shestowsky, Inside the Mind of the Client: An Analysis of Litigants’
Decision Criteria for Choosing Procedure, 36 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 69, 82 (2018)
(“The modal response to both ex post survey questions indicates that lawyers
tend to drive procedural use. Moreover, among represented litigants, those who
initially referenced an intent to rely on a lawyer’s input were significantly more
likely to mention relying on their lawyer in their ex post responses . . . .”).
169. Shestowsky, supra note 45, at 205 (“It is possible that if these researchers had
surveyed the clients . . . . they may have discovered that litigants had a different
perspective regarding whether discussions about procedures took place. Moreover
. . . they do not provide a picture of how well unrepresented litigants come to
know about their options.”).
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B. Implications Relating to Client Counseling and Informed
Consent
In addition to fundamental ethical issues, our research has additional implications for lawyers, dispute resolution professionals, and
court systems. Although the previous section on ethical implications
touched on issues related to client counseling, this section considers
broader implications of those issues beyond the ethical requirements,
which are often considered an ethical floor that lawyers should strive
for conduct and performance well beyond.170
This section considers how our research impacts three practical
considerations. First, this section considers how our research might
impact client-centered counseling, a relatively new and popular theory
guiding how lawyers and clients interact throughout the course of the
relationship. Second, we consider how this research might affect dispute resolution professionals given the significant gaps in knowledge
of key features of these processes. Finally, this section considers implications for court systems, particularly relating to working with unrepresented clients.
1. Client-Centered Counseling
The traditional model of the lawyer–client relationship is centered
around the lawyer. Under the theory of lawyer-centered counseling,
the lawyer, as the legal expert, makes most decisions in the relationship (other than those required under Rule 1.2).171 Others describe
the relationship as one in which the client delegates the decision-making authority to the lawyer, as agent.172 Under this theory, the role of
the client is “passive.”173 The lawyer-centered model is often associ170. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, pmbl. cmt. 7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“A
lawyer should strive to attain the highest level of skill, to improve the law and
the legal profession and to exemplify the legal profession’s ideals of public service.”); id. cmt. 16 (“The Rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical
considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity
can be completely defined by legal rules.”).
171. Professor Katherine Kruse illustrates one of the downfalls of lawyer-based counseling by looking at the Spaulding v. Zimmerman case that is taught in nearly
every legal ethics and professional responsibility class. See Katherine R. Kruse,
Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103 (2010)
(discussing Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962)). In the case,
the defense attorney did not disclose a life-threatening medical condition of the
plaintiff that was only discovered by a defense-side medical expert. Id. at 105–06.
She notes that the lawyer likely “saw his job as simply to maximize his client’s
legal and financial interests” when the client might have preferred to disclose
given the friendly relationship between the parties. Id.
172. Todd A. Berger, The Constitutional Limits of Client-Centered Decision Making, 50
U. RICH. L. REV. 1089, 1110 (2016) (describing the lawyer-centered approach).
173. Id. at 1110 (“[T]he client’s role in the representation becomes largely passive.”).
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ated with the tactical decision to take advantage of every possible legal advantage in the name of zealous representation.174
Recently, a client-centered model of the attorney–client relationship emerged. Client-centered counseling, or client-centered lawyering, “focuses on the desires of the client” and considers client
autonomy to be of “paramount importance.”175 This philosophy asks
lawyers “to approach their clients as whole persons who are more than
the sum of their legal interests.”176 Sometimes called a “participatory
model” of lawyering, this theory provides more opportunity for “nonlegal considerations” compared to the traditional, legally-focused
model.177 Some scholars describe this philosophy as “empowering” clients to make their own decisions, particularly for disadvantaged
clients.178
This method of counseling employs active listening skills to ensure
the lawyer understands the client’s situation and that the client feels
heard.179 Through dialogue, the lawyer and client should both better
understand the situation and the client’s interests. Importantly, the
lawyer provides options for the client regarding strategy, but the client ultimately decides the best course for the representation.180 In
this way, the lawyer in the client-centered strategy may remain “neutral” to the outcome while the client’s needs and interests are
satisfied.181
Client-centered counseling is one approach to the attorney–client
relationship and not without some flaws. Professor Cochran argues
that the client-centered approach may have the consequence of being
self-centered, i.e., not concerned with the interests of others unless the
174. Id. at 1112–13 (discussing a client-centered approach).
175. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Which “Client-Centered Counselors?”: A Reply to Professor
Freedman, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 355, 358 (2011).
176. Kruse, supra note 171, at 127; see Alex J. Hurder, The Lawyer’s Dilemma: To Be
or Not to Be a Problem-Solving Negotiator, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 253, 273 (2007)
(“The reference to a problem rather than a case suggests a broader view of the
lawyer’s role than the lawyer’s traditional conception of a case implies.”).
177. BLANKLEY & WESTON, supra note 6, at 11; see also Katherine R. Kruse, Bobbi
McAdoo & Sharon Press, Client Problem Solving: Where ADR and Lawyering
Skills Meet, 7 ELON L. REV. 225, 246–47 (2015) (describing the move away from
the lawyer-centered model, which was described as “paternalistic,” and the move
toward better understanding of client needs and goals).
178. Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation Skills and Client-Centered Lawyering: A New
View of the Partnership, 19 CLINICAL L. REV. 429, 447 (2013) (describing the goal
as “to strengthen the client’s own capacity for self-determination and agency”).
179. Cochran, supra note 175, at 359 (describing reasons for use of active listening
with clients); see also Kruse, supra note 171, at 128 (“Under the client-centered
approach, hearing clients’ stories and understanding their values, cares, and
commitments is the first step and a continuing duty of legal representation.”).
180. Cochran, supra note 175, at 359 (“The client then decides among the
alternatives.”).
181. Id. at 360.
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client articulates the interests of others as the client’s own interest.182
In addition, although the lawyer may aim for meeting client needs or
even empowerment, only the client can determine whether those goals
have actually been met in a given situation.183
Because our research shows a low level of knowledge regarding
ADR processes, as well as some potential misconceptions of those
processes, lawyers who are already engaged in client-centered counseling may be particularly motivated to include more process-related
education in their practices. These lawyers may also consider using
active-listening tools to ensure that the client not only receives the
information but also understands the information well enough to
make informed choices.184 For instance, if a client indicates a preference for a particular process, the lawyer could easily ask “why?” to
determine if the client’s interests actually align with the chosen process. If a client indicates a willingness to mediate as a method to not
only resolve a legal dispute but also to reconcile with an estranged
sibling, the lawyer could be more assured that the client understands
how mediation can achieve both of those interests. Engaging in conversations about dispute resolution process options may have the added benefit of providing a different framework for discussing and
exploring the client’s interests. For example, explaining facilitative
mediation as a collaborative and creative process that can result in
mutually beneficial agreements might shift clients out of a “winner
take all” mindset and elucidate an opportunity to consider interests
they previously ignored given the limited framework of litigation.
2. Education by ADR Professionals to Participants
Given the general public’s lack of self-reported knowledge and experience with alternative processes, ADR providers and provider organizations may need to provide additional information to participants
to ensure informed consent and eliminate misconceptions. This study
may give practitioners and programs insight into how much education
may be necessary for their clients.
Dispute resolution processes, particularly consensual processes
such as negotiation, mediation, and, to a lesser extent, processes such
as mini-trials and early neutral evaluation, rely on the participants’
182. Id. (“[I]f the lawyer identifies some considerations that are important (consequences to the client) and fails to identify other considerations (consequences to
other people), the client is likely to assume that consequences to other people are
not important.”).
183. Bush, supra note 178, at 448–49 (“Problem-solving skills, as they are conventionally taught, do not necessarily ensure either client empowerment or interactional
improvement.”).
184. See supra notes 36–44 (discussing Bloom’s Taxonomy and its importance in decision-making).
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informed consent to attend and participate in the process. As Professor Shestowsky stated: “The concept of party self-determination plays
an important role in the history of ADR.”185 Professor Nolan-Haley
describes: “Informed consent is a foundational principle that promotes
human dignity, advances autonomy, and enhances party self-determination.”186 Most ADR processes directly involve the parties in the conversation, the process, the generation of ideas, and the ultimate
decision on how to resolve the dispute.187
Codes of ethics for nearly all types of dispute resolution rely on
voluntary participation and informed consent. For mediators, informed consent involves the parties’ ability to make decisions about
the resolution of the dispute and the process itself. The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators provides:
A mediator shall conduct a mediation based on the principle of party self-determination. Self-determination is the act of coming to a voluntary, uncoerced
decision in which each party makes free and informed choices as to process
and outcome. Parties may exercise self-determination at any stage of a mediation, including mediator selection, process design, participation in or withdrawal from the process, and outcomes.188

Professor Nolan-Haley describes informed consent as a “core value” of
mediation189 and as a concept based on the twin principles of “disclosure and consent.”190 Parties can only give “informed” consent if they
understand what is happening.191 Other consensual processes, such
as Ombuds practice192 and early neutral evaluation,193 similarly
value voluntary participation and informed consent.
185. Shestowsky, supra note 45, at 194 (“[T]he animating impulse behind most of the
‘ADR movement’ has advocated for client choice in dispute resolution and ‘selfdetermination’ in mediation.”).
186. Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Does ADR’s “Access to Justice” Come at the Expense of
Meaningful Consent?, 33 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 373, 391 (2018).
187. See id. at 194–95.
188. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard I(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N,
AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N & SOC’Y OF PROF’LS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION 2005).
189. Nolan-Haley, supra note 186, at 376.
190. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle
for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775, 778 (1999) (“At
a minimum, the principle of informed consent requires that parties be educated
about the mediation process before they consent to participate in it, that their
continued participation in mediation be voluntary, and that they understand and
consent to the outcomes reached in mediation.”).
191. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct for lawyers defines “informed consent”
as “the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer
has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material
risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.”
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
192. IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE Standard 4.4 (INT’L OMBUDSMAN ASS’N 2009), https:/
/www.ombudsassociation.org/assets/docs/IOA_Standards_of_Practice_Oct09.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/WE6Z-S3DU] (“Use of the Ombudsman Office is voluntary, and is not a required step in any grievance process or organizational
policy.”).
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Arbitration is also a model built on consent, albeit manifested in a
different way than in mediation. Parties agree to arbitration through
contract, usually made prior to a dispute arising.194 The arbitration
process is flexible and customizable, which holds potential for informed consent and autonomy, but parties rarely know about or take
advantage of such options.195 Research to date suggests that consumers in particular do not notice or understand arbitration agreements
in their contracts, thus casting doubt on whether the participants
gave voluntary consent to participate,196 even if they have entered
into legally-binding contracts.
If the lay public either lacks understanding about a process they
are about to enter or indicates misunderstanding, the neutral or service provider should educate the disputant to ensure informed consent. The findings in this Article should be shared with neutrals and
provider organizations so they can adjust their practices and even
their outreach to the general public. Perhaps mediators and arbitrators need to rethink how they intake cases and present opening remarks to the parties to ensure informed consent. Provider
organizations may also be interested in additional education of the
public through webinars, access-to-justice initiatives, and informational videos.
3. Education by Court Systems to Pro Se Litigants
Finally, this research has implications for the court system, particularly in the education that courts provide for pro se parties. Parties
proceed pro se for a variety of reasons, but the primary reason cited by
litigants is an inability to afford representation.197 The number of
193. See, e.g., S.C. ADR COURT RULES r. 3(a) (S.C. JUDICIAL BRANCH 2019) (providing
that parties may voluntarily engage in early neutral evaluation in lieu of a courtrequired mediation); N.D. CAL. ADR RULES r. 5-2 (2018) (noting that cases may
be referred to early neutral evaluation “following a stipulation by all parties”).
194. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018) (making arbitration agreements enforceable by the
courts).
195. See Clark Freshman, Tweaking the Market for Autonomy: A Problem-Solving Perspective to Informed Consent in Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 909, 929–30
(2002) (noting that parties likely do not know what options they have in arbitration so they do not ask for any).
196. Greenberg, supra note 16 at 215–16 (describing a study in which parties who
read consumer agreements did not recall seeing an arbitration agreement);
Schmitz, supra note 18, at 157–58 (discussing a consumer study regarding comprehension of arbitration agreements by consumers).
197. See, e.g., INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., CASES WITHOUT
COUNSEL 12 (2016), https://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/cases_without_counsel_research_report.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/5CTMSSDY] [hereinafter Cases Without Counsel] (noting that in the IAALS study of
pro se family law participants, financial reasons appeared in upwards of 90% of
cases); see also LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP 13–14 (2017), https://
www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf [https://
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parties proceeding pro se is rising rapidly, causing burdens on the
court system.198 Although pro se parties may possess a basic understanding of the court system and court processes from media exposure
or even personal experience, court processes are complicated and intimidating.199 Often, parties have questions about procedure, and
court personnel—such as clerks and librarians—cannot always answer due to the prohibition on providing legal advice.200 This increase
in pro se parties, combined with the difficulties those parties experience while participating in the system, has caused concern for court
systems, legal service providers, and access to justice commissions.201
Courts currently provide educational materials to parties, particularly through online resources, videos, forms, and brochures.202 They
also establish protocols on whether and how they answer questions
posed by parties.203 Many courts have mandatory dispute resolution

198.

199.

200.

201.
202.

203.

perma.unl.edu/78NK-HB5C] [hereinafter Justice Gap] (describing the level of
need of low-income households for legal services and the inability of legal aid
organizations to provide support for a vast majority of those needs).
See, e.g., COMM. ON CIVIL JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT OF GA. EQUAL JUSTICE
COMM’N, CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW AND MODERATE INCOME HOUSEHOLDS IN
GEORGIA 2–3 (2009), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/delivery_legal_services/downloads/georgia_legal_needs_study.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/QV5K-EH3P] (describing the high numbers of low-income clients
and the burdens these pro se parties put on the court system); 21ST CENTURY
PRACTICE TASK FORCE, STATE BAR OF MICH., ENVISIONING A NEW FUTURE TODAY 3
(2016), https://www.michbar.org/file/future/21c_WorkProduct.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/V8XY-UDX6] (noting that as many as 80% of legal needs of the
poor remain unmet).
Cases Without Counsel, supra note 197, at 2 (describing self-represented litigants
as “feeling lost or ‘in the dark,’ relating both to the individual steps and the big
picture of the case”); id. at 30–33 (describing navigating the process and completing required forms and pleadings as stressful).
Id. at 27–28 (discussing frustration by pro se parties with court staff over the
inability to answer questions the pro se parties view as simple and not necessarily a question of legal advice). In its 2017 report on The Justice Gap, Legal Services Corporation described a category of clients as “Unable to Serve Fully.”
Justice Gap, supra note 197, at 64. These clients often receive legal information
or limited legal advice but not full representation due to insufficient funding. Id.
See Justice Gap, supra note 197, at 42–45 (discussing the number of cases that
legal service corporations can serve and needs that go unmet).
See, e.g., THE OFFICE OF DEPUTY CHIEF ADMIN. JUDGE FOR JUSTICE INITIATIVES,
EXPANDING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN NEW YORK STATE 22–23 (2009), https://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/delivery_legal_services/
downloads/expanding_access_to_justice_in_new_york_state.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/NR85-733L] (describing form packets and online resources for pro
se parties); SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE 25–27
(2015), http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Publications/accessJustice/finalReport.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/5WZ5-ZNKA] (discussing the need for forms and
online resources).
THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF ADMIN. JUDGE FOR JUSTICE INITIATIVES, SELFREPRESENTED LITIGANTS 11 (2005), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/delivery_legal_services/downloads/nyselfrepresentedliti-
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programs, particularly mediation programs,204 and those programs do
not distinguish between represented parties and pro se parties.
Courts, then, must educate unrepresented parties about those
processes and what is expected of them. In some instances, state law
dictates the contents of those educational disclosures.205
Our findings show that the lay population does not have a good
understanding of dispute resolution processes. Courts may need or
want to provide additional education to individual litigants regarding
both voluntary and mandatory dispute resolution processes. In districts with voluntary dispute resolution options, litigants may need
additional information to understand their options and choose accordingly. Districts with mandatory dispute resolution also need education
for participants. Although the litigants do not choose whether to participate, the lack of knowledge found in this study shows that pro se
litigants likely need additional information to understand the process
in which they will be required to participate. Courts and clerks’ offices
can provide this education in a number of ways, such as short video
explanations, brochures, articles, or other means.
VII. CONCLUSION
In some ways, the results examined here are basic, even unremarkable. More than anything, the research team discovered a gap
in the public’s knowledge base regarding what ADR processes actually
entail. The researchers also uncovered that the public has a different
perception of key features of mediation and arbitration than practicing mediators and arbitrators. Despite the simplicity of these results,
the implications of this research are far reaching and, to date,
unexplored.
Legal ethics and dispute resolution ethics are both built on the
foundational concept of informed consent. This research shows that
the lay public lacks its key underpinning—knowledge. Despite the
gants.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/T5PK-6P5K] (discussing potential ways that clients can receive answers to legal questions, such as telephone hotlines and public
meetings with lawyers who can answer basic client questions over forms).
204. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, FAMILY JUSTICE INITIATIVE 22 (2018) (on file with author) (noting that twenty-two states have
mandatory mediation programs in domestic relations cases).
205. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2925(2) (Reissue 2007) (requiring courts to provide
information to all parties on the timeline of the litigation process, mediation services, and other resources in all family cases). In Nebraska, this law is satisfied
when the clerk of courts provides all parties to a family law case a brochure created by the Office of Dispute Resolution. See NEB. STATE COURT ADM’R, NEBRASKA
PARENTING ACT INFORMATION BROCHURE (2017), https://supremecourt.nebras
ka.gov/sites/default/files/Programs/mediation/Reports/Parenting_Act_Brochure_
7-17.pdf.
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many advances in the ADR field over the last fifty years, the message
has clearly not been received by the general public.
This research suggests that because ADR is not a household term,
additional outreach will be necessary to individual parties and to the
general public. Lawyers may need to take additional care while counseling clients to ensure they know their options and can make informed choices. Individual neutrals may need to spend additional time
with their clients to ensure the parties understand the process and
their roles in it. Court systems and ADR providers could also provide
additional public education to advance the knowledge of the public.
If these, and other efforts, are made to increase the understanding
of ADR processes generally, researchers should re-survey the public to
see if the efforts have been successful. The ADR movement depends on
a wide variety of stakeholders, and public support would greatly increase its use and popularity.

